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D.J.Branson 
The tort/contract boundary: great divide or grand illusion? 
IViasters in Jurisprudence 1997 
This thesis considers the difference between contract and the 
tort of negligence. It compares the traditional view of the distinction 
with a more contemporary view, and concludes that the two areas of 
law are becoming interrelated. 
Three main aspects of contract and tort are compared; the 
nature of the liability, the scope of the liability and the extent of the 
remedy. The historical origins of the two areas of law are explored, 
as are the ideological concepts which underpin them. There is also an 
investigation of how the courts in the UK deal with the relationship 
between contract and tort in both contracts for services and contracts 
of service; these being two areas where there is a considerable 
overlap between contractual and tortious liability. 
The thesis argues that contract and the tort of negligence are 
based on common historical roots and underpinned by common 
ideologies. In both cases, the courts seek to decide liability on the 
basis of 'reasonableness', a subjective concept which is determined 
according to their own criteria. This is seen as related to such factors 
as the bargaining power of the litigants, and their opportunities to 
secure alternative means of protection against liability. It is suggested 
that this is more important than whether the action is brought in 
contract or tort. 
The nature of the contract/tort divide is considered in the 
alternative jurisdiction of New Zealand, in order to see how it deals 
with the problems posed. The thesis concludes by considering 
whether an alternative model could be constructed in order to explain 
the current nature of the relationship between contract and tort, and 
what type of relationship should exist. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem stated 
1.1 The traditional distinction between contract and tort 
1.1.1 According to legal writers there is a clear distinction between 
contract and tort, what could be considered to be a 'great divide'. This 
can be seen if we compare the traditional definitions of contract and 
tort. One of the standard definitions of contract is that given by Treitel 
which states; 
'A contract is an agreement giving rise to obligations which are 
enforced or recognised by law. The factor which distinguishes 
contract from other legal obligations is that they are based on 
the agreement of the contracting parties' (1) 
1.1.2 The essential element here is the concept of an agreement 
between two or more parties. It is this which defines the nature of the 
liability and its extent. In contrast, one of the best known definitions 
of the Law of Tort is that laid down by Winfield; 
'Tortious liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed 
by law; this duty is towards persons generally and its breach is 
redressable by an action for unliquidated damages' (2) 
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1.1.3 This definition argues that the liability is unrelated to any 
agreement but is imposed by law and applies to all persons. As such 
it derives from the idea that a person is legally responsible for injury 
or loss caused to others. 
1.1.4 There are other ways of analysing the difference in approach 
between contract and tort. It has been argued that contract focuses 
on promise whilst tort focuses on injury to the plaintiff (3). Similarly it 
could be said that contract protects future interests whilst tort protects 
present interest, or alternatively that tort is protective and contract is 
productive (4). These ideas reflect a view of contract and tort as being 
essentially different in nature. 
1.2 The alternative viewpoint 
1.2.1 Despite these apparent conflicting aims and ideas, several legal 
writers have argued that the differences between contract and tort are 
becoming less important, even to the extent that it may soon become 
impossible to distinguish between them. According to Gilmore; 
'We seem to be in the presence of the phenomenon which in 
the history of comparative religion is known as syncretism - that 
is, according to Webster "the reconciliation or union of 
conflicting beliefs" ....this line, if it continues to be followed, may 
ultimately provide the doctrinal justification for the fusing of 
contract and tort in a unified theory of civil obligation'(5). 
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1.2.2 Other legal writers have taken a similar view. Atiyah sees the 
development of a 'unifying conceptual structure for the law of 
obligations' based on the 'concepts of reciprocal benefits, acts of 
reasonable reliance and voluntary human conduct' (6). Similarly 
Markesinis finds it difficult to distinguish between the two areas of law 
in practice (7). 
1.2.3 Essentially we have a conflict of opinion over whether these 
two areas of law are effectively different doctrines, or different aspects 
of the same doctrine. In this thesis I wish to explore the nature of the 
contract/tort divide, especially in respect of the tort of negligence. This 
is because the two areas of law often impinge on the same set of 
circumstances, as in contracts for services, and so provide greater 
possibilities for overlap. 
2. The Traditional Framework 
2.1 Areas of analysis 
2.1.1 In order to analyse the difference between contract and tort I 
would like to begin by considering the way in which the difference 
was traditionally defined in the last century. To this end I feel it is 
useful to look at three main areas where the two types of law are 
seen to be quite different. These I refer to as the 'nature of the 
liability', the 'scope of the liability' and the 'extent of the remedy'. I 
have defined these as three separate areas but we will see that they 
are to a great extent interrelated. For ease of reference I have 
summarised the differences on Table 1 at the end of the Chapter. 
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2.2 The Nature of Liability 
2.2.1 In contract law, legal liability is seen as based upon a reciprocal 
agreement between the contracting parties, and from this stems the 
idea that the liability is restricted to the contracting parties alone, the 
foundation of the doctrine of privity. Similarly, the need for an 
agreement presupposes that both parties freely consented and so it 
is important to show consensus. In English Law the idea of reciprocity 
also requires the existence of consideration and disallows the 
enforcement of 'mere promises'. From this we can see the reason for 
the development of the doctrines of privity and consideration. 
Moreover, in order to ensure that the wishes of the contracting parties 
are actually adhered to, then it is argued that it is necessary to 
interpret the terms of the contract strictly, unless the contracting 
parties define their liability in fault based terms. 
2.2.2 In tort, liability is imposed by society through the medium of the 
law. This liability is based on the need to protect members of that 
society and it arises in respect of the injury suffered by the plaintiff. 
The defendant is liable if he is seen to be at fault in causing the 
injury. In this respect there is no need for a preexisting arrangement 
and so no need to show privity, consensus or consideration. 
Moreover, the nature of the liability is defined by society, not by the 
individuals involved, and to this extent it will be fault based and 
grounded upon the principles of fairness and reasonableness. 
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2.3 The Scope of the Liability 
2.3.1 The traditional view is that contractual liability will take priority 
over other forms of liability such as that arising in tort, so that the 
wishes of the contracting parties are enforced by law. As a result, it 
is sometimes argued that where there is a contractual liability it will 
extinguish the right to a tortious liability, in effect denying the principle 
of concurrent liability. 
2.3.2 Even if concurrent liability is accepted, the primacy of contract 
is asserted by stating that the express terms of a contract are 
sacrosanct and cannot be modified or limited in any way. Moreover, 
the right of a contract breaker to seek apportionment of damages on 
the grounds of contributory negligence is also denied, as this is seen 
as a purely tortious principle and as such subordinate to contractual 
rights and liabilities. 
2.4 The extent of the Remedy 
2.4.1 In contract, as the nature of the liability is defined by the 
contracting parties, so is the extent of their remedy. As such the 
parties can only claim for damages within their own contemplation (8). 
This will effectively be expectation losses such as lost profits, as the 
commercial origins of contract law tend to define losses in commercial 
terms . However, it will not include injury to feelings, which is not seen 
as a commercial loss. It should be noted that the limitation period for 
claims runs from the breach of agreement and not the occurrence of 
damage, thereby reflecting the fact that liability here relates to the 
breach of the agreement and not occurrence of the injury. 
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2.4.2 In tort the extent of the liability is defined by society and relates 
to the injury. The defendant is liable for all reasonably foreseeable 
losses (9), but these are calculated according to the actual loss 
incurred and not expectation losses. Nevertheless, this can 
sometimes be a wider liability than that in contract (10), and will often 
include losses for distress or injured feelings. Similarly, the time for 
the commencement of the limitation period runs from the occurrence 
of the injury or when the plaintiff becomes aware of it, which itself can 
be more beneficial to the plaintiff. 
2.4.3 It can be seen that the damages in contract and tort as 
traditionally defined are essentially complementary. Whilst 
compensation for economic loss is usually unrecoverable in tort, this 
is the essential measure of contractual damages. Similarly, damages 
for pain or injured feelings can be compensated in tort, but contract 
only looks to the commercial implications such as loss of earnings. It 
Is true that there is an element of overlap In the traditional model with 
regard to loss of earnings which can be seen as lost profits; but this 
is only recoverable in respect of earnings which are certain and not 
those based on expectation. 
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3. The underlying ideology of contract and tort law 
3.1 The traditional framework 
3.1.1 The underlying ideological framework upon which the traditional 
distinction between contract and tort is based, is a product of the 19th 
century. As regards contract law, this is seen as based on the rights 
of individuals to determine their own legal liabilities without the 
intervention of the state. This is the concept of 'freedom of contract' 
which relates to an atomistic view of society in which individual free 
will and the market place are the key determinants of legal rights and 
duties. As such it can be seen as morally neutral, in that the law does 
not overtly seek to impose any overall moral criteria in judging the 
validity of such contracts, so long as they are based on consent and 
are made for a legal purpose. Such ideas are related to the 19th 
century concept of 'laisser faire', whereby the state considered that 
it was not its duty to regulate commercial activity but that this should 
be left to market forces. This ideological approach has been referred 
to by some academics as 'market individualism' (11). 
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3.1.2 The ideological basis of tort is to be found in the criminal law 
from which it developed. The key issue is that society seeks to protect 
its members who suffer harm by way of penalising the wrongdoers for 
their actions. Such penalties were originally punitive as well as 
compensatory and in early medieval times it was difficult to 
disentangle the criminal from the civil liability. By the 19th century, tort 
had become an essentially civil remedy, the main concern of which 
was to provide a remedy for the injured party. However, this was 
based still on the idea of 'corrective justice' whereby the punishment 
of the tortfeasor was a key issue. The main difference from contract 
was that the state believed that part of its role was to determine the 
extent of the remedy, and in so doing imposed its own ideas of what 
was just and fair. 
3.2 Changing ideologies 
3.2.1 In the 20th century, there has been a considerable change in 
attitude as to the role of the state in contractual relationships. This 
has been noted by many writers and has been referred to by Collins 
as 'the transformation thesis' (12). This involves a move away from 
the idea of the law leaving such relationships to be determined by 
contracting parties, and involves instead the desire to import into such 
relationships the morally charged ideas of fairness and good faith. 
This has also included a growing concern for the plight of the weaker 
bargaining party, a development referred to as 'Consumer Welfarism' 
(13) or sometimes as 'Communitarianism' (14). 
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3.2.2 In addition, there is a growing concern that the tortious liability 
should fall on the shoulders of the party who is most able to bear the 
burden. This is the concept of 'distributive justice' whereby courts now 
consider the importance of insurance factors in spreading the loss 
amongst a variety of parties, instead of loading it upon the tortfeasor. 
As such, it involves a move away from the idea of 'corrective justice' 
whereby the law was mainly concerned to rectify the original wrong, 
and instead takes into consideration social and economic 
relationships including the bargaining power of the parties involved. 
In this way the courts have begun to define the idea of fairness and 
justice in relation to wider societal aims. 
3.2.3 These changes have had an impact on both contract and tort 
but particularly on the former, as this was more clearly based on 
contrary principles which eschewed any idea of an externally imposed 
idea of fairness. However, I would argue that they have been 
instrumental in breaking down the barriers between contract and tort, 
because they have both led to the courts imposing their own ideas of 
what is reasonable, and in so doing, they have blurred the distinction 
between these areas of law. 
4. The impact on the traditional framework 
4.1 Contract Law 
4.1.1 This change in ideological viewpoint has impacted upon contract 
law in various ways and has effectively altered its relationship with 
tort. We can see the key areas of change are likely to have an 
important effect on important aspects of contract law. 
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4.1.2 Traditionally, the basis of the contractual liability is the 
agreement between two parties from which are derived the twin 
requirements of privity and consideration. Yet both of these doctrines 
are likely to lead to unreasonable results which to some extent negate 
the intentions of the contracting parties. The requirement for privity 
means that third parties cannot enforce a contract even if it is made 
for their benefit, or where one of the contracting parties acts 
inequitably to frustrate the wishes of the other contracting party. In 
addition, the requirement for consideration can defeat a claim for 
enforcement of a promise where both parties could reasonably expect 
such a promise to be honoured. It is difficult to understand why legal 
liability should depend on an exchange of promises where one party's 
promise may be quite nebulous. 
4.1.3 The traditional view that liability should be strict as regards 
express terms also conflicts with the idea of reasonableness, as it can 
lead to unconscionable bargains usually at the expense of the weaker 
party. This also affects the use of exclusion or limitation clauses as 
they could be used to escape liability even where the courts think this 
is unreasonable. The impact of the above changes is likely to blur the 
distinction between contract and tort as the courts would wish to 
import the same ideas of reasonableness into both areas of law. If 
this does happen we might consider whether other tortious concepts 
such as contributory negligence might begin to affect contractual 
liability. 
4.1.4 Finally, it could be argued that if the nature of the liability is to 
be underpinned by concepts of reasonableness, the extent of the 
damages should also be so affected. This would involve the need to 
redefine the extent of contractual damages so that it is not purely tied 
to the expectations of the parties. 
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4.2 Tort Law 
4.2.1 The impact on tort law has been more indirect and less 
dramatic. This reflects the fact that the ideological drift has been 
towards concepts more clearly at home in tort law than in the 
traditional areas of contract. 
4.2.2 However, we might expect to see an effect as regards the 
extent of the remedies so as to ensure that the traditional limitation 
on tortious damages would be overridden. It is difficult to justify the 
restriction of tortious damages to actual loss, be this direct or 
consequential, rather than allowing expectation loss. Such losses 
have been accepted for negligent misstatement under the heading of 
'economic loss' since the case of HEDLEY BYRNE v HELLER (1963) 
(15). Moreover such losses are claimable for fraudulent 
misrepresentation as part of the total loss as in EAST v MAURER 
(1991) (16) and even for negligent misrepresentation as in ESSO v 
MARDON (1976) (17). Given the availability of damages to cover loss 
of expectation in these areas it would be unreasonable to restrict 
these damages in areas of negligent action. 
4.3 Oyerall effect 
4.3.1 Overall we can see that there are various factors here which 
suggest that the nature of contractual and tortious liability may well 
become similar. The move to base liability on external concepts of 
'reasonableness' is likely to affect the nature of both contract and 
tortious liability but it is also likely to blur the differences between the 
two. 
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5. Contradictions in the law 
5.1 The basic problem 
5.1.1 We have seen how the area of contract law in particular, and 
tort to some extent, have been affected by changes in the law's 
perception of the underlying values. It should be noted that these 
changes have not been total and so this has created a tension within 
the law that leads to contradictions within it. This can be seen most 
clearly in contract law, but also affects tort law. 
5.2 Contradictions in contract law 
5.2.1 These contradictions arise as a result of the conflict between the 
traditional view of contract (or 'classical' contract law as it is 
sometimes referred to), and the modern concepts outlined above. 
This can lead to a number of problems in contract law. 
5.2.2 Let us take, for example, the issues of consensus and strict 
liability. The traditional view looks only for outward signs of consent 
and then imposes strict liability according to the contract terms. The 
modern view looks for real evidence that the parties freely wish to 
consent to the particular terms involved, and also ensures that those 
terms are fair. In BUTLER MACHINE TOOL CO v EX-CELL-0 CORP 
(1979) (18) the courts found an agreement on the terms of the buyer 
which involved a fixed price clause, as opposed to the price variation 
clause which was in the seller's terms. The court decided this by 
applying traditional contract law rules of offer and acceptance, even 
though it was clear that there was never any real consensus between 
the parties. Moreover, the issue of fairness was never really 
addressed. 
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5.2.3 Contrast this case with INTERFOTO v STILETTO VISUAL 
PROGRAMMES LTD (1988) (19) where the courts refused to enforce 
the strict terms of the contract in respect of an onerous clause. In this 
case the courts discussed the issue in terms of exclusion clauses, 
although it was effectively an onerous term. It is clear that the court 
took into consideration the modern concepts of fairness and good 
faith rather than relying on traditional views of offer and acceptance. 
We can see here the views of Bingham LJ: 
'...In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems 
outside the common law world, the law of obligations recognises 
and enforces an overriding principle that in making and carrying 
out contracts parties should act in good faith....its effect is 
perhaps most aptly conveyed by such metaphorical 
colloquialisms as 'playing fair', 'coming clean' or 'putting one's 
cards face upward on the table'. It is in essence a principle of 
fair and open dealing. In such a forum it might, I think, be held 
on the facts of the case that the plaintiffs were under a duty in 
all fairness to draw the defendants' attention specifically to the 
high price payable if the transparencies were not returned in 
time...'(20). 
5.2.4 There are various issues which are notable about these two 
cases. Firstly, in both cases we have a commercial contract with no 
special case for protection. In both cases the clause was an onerous 
clause which was not brought to the attention of the other party, 
although in neither case was there a suggestion of fraud or deception. 
Yet in the first case the courts considered the issue in purely 
traditional contract law language, whilst in the second case it is clear 
that the issues of fairness and good faith were of crucial importance, 
as well as the reality of consent. 
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5.3 Contradictions in tort law 
5.3.1 The same kind of problems occur to a lesser degree in tort law. 
This is mainly due to the incursion of tortious actions into traditional 
contract law territory, particularly the actions for 'economic loss' which 
have grown from HEDLEY BYRNE v HELLER 
5.3.2 This has led to conflicting approaches to similar problems. In 
MURPHY V BRENTWOOD DISTRICT COUNCIL (1990) (21) the 
courts refused to find a duty of care in respect of a negligent 
misstatement by a local authority. Nevertheless, in the jointly heard 
cases of SMITH v BUSH and HARRIS v WYRE DISTRICT COUNCIL 
(1989) (22) the court found a valuer liable to the house purchaser in 
respect of a negligently made valuation, even though this was 
essentially a similar case of negligence by the defendant. 
5.3.3 The two cases were decided without reference to one another 
and the discrepancy between the two has excited the interest of 
academics. Various arguments have been put forward to resolve the 
apparent contradiction, including the idea that ability to provide 
contractual protection was a key factor (23), or that it related to the 
size and bargaining power of the plaintiff (24). 
5.3.4 In fact it would appear that tort law has become confused as a 
result of its attempt to provide a remedy for the faults of the contract 
law system. As such, it is still not clear what the rationale behind 
SMITH V BUSH actually is. 
Page 14 
6. Conclusion 
6.1 The basic problem 
6.1.1 We can see how the change in the underlying ideology of law 
has posed problems for both contract and tort and has led to 
conflicting cases. The move away from the traditional rules of 
'classical' contract law to deciding cases on the basis of ideas such 
as 'fairness' raises many complex questions. As both of these terms 
are highly subjective, there will be a tendency to base decisions on 
a separate agenda which may concern itself with the bargaining 
power of the two parties. This of course raises the crucial issue of 
how we define bargaining power in the first place. 
6.2 The aim of the thesis 
6.2.1 The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between 
contract and tort and see to what extent the change in ideology has 
affected the traditional contract/tort divide. I will also consider the 
issue of how that divide should be drawn, if at all. 
6.2.2 In order to do this I shall consider the three key aspects outlined 
earlier in this chapter, namely; the nature of the liability, the scope of 
the liability and the extent of the remedy. It is intended to follow these 
themes through the next chapters where I shall look initially at the 
contract/tort divide in its historical context to see how it arose. I shall 
then look at the ideological context in which contract and tort operate 
and discuss their respective purposes. This will be followed by an 
analysis of how the UK courts deal with the operation of the 
contract/tort divide in the area of contracts for services and contracts 
of service. Finally I shall be drawing comparisons with another 
jurisdiction to see how the contract/tort divide operates there. 
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6.2.3 Ultimately, it is intended to draw together some conclusions on 
the present state of the contract/tort divide and to analyse how it has 
been affected by the changing ideology which underlies the law. 
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Chapter 2 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACT AND TORT 
1. Introduction 
1.1 General Overview 
1.1.1 In this chapter, 1 intend to examine the origins of the modern 
law of contract and tort, or more specifically the tort of negligence. It 
is in these origins that I will argue that the confusion between contract 
and tort first arises, and that this problem has never really been 
resolved. I will look at the development of contract and tort using the 
analytical framework first developed in chapter 1. To this end I will 
consider the differences in the nature of liability, the scope of liability 
and the extent of the remedy. This offers a useful way of considering 
the relationship between the two areas of law, because the scope of 
the liability as well as the extent of the remedy are different but 
interrelated aspects, both of which are dependant on the nature of the 
liability. 
1.1.2 We need to consider various factors when looking at the 
development of law in a historical context. In particular we must 
always be aware that legal developments often look obvious or 
inevitable in retrospect, but at the time they often arise out of a desire 
to solve practical problems (1). We should not impart too great a 
prescience to medieval lawyers; it is arguably only in the 19th century 
that we see the development of a coherent ideological framework for 
contract or tort. 
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1.2 The Writ System 
1.2.1 An important factor in the development of ttie law in medieval 
times was the writ system. This required all actions in the common 
law courts to be commenced by issuing a particular writ. Moreover, 
different forms of action had different requirements of proof and 
methods of judgement. For example, an action in covenant required 
written proof of agreement under seal; whilst an action for debt was 
decided by 'wager of law' and an action in trespass was decided by 
jury trial. 
1.2.2 All of these requirements caused problems. Written evidence 
under seal was rarely available for most minor agreements. The 
'Wager of Law' required the defendant to swear on oath that he was 
not liable and to obtain eleven other persons to do the same. This 
method of trial ceased to be effective as feudal society broke down, 
and the alternative method of trial by jury was increasingly preferred 
by the plaintiff and judiciary (2). However, this method also had its 
problems, as juries could be subject to pressure, until the judiciary 
were able to take the legal decisions out of the hands of the jury by 
the late 18th century. 
1.2.3 With regard to the development of the law, we have a fluid 
situation, where new legal Issues were arising which an Increasingly 
rigid writ system could not cope with. The problem was avoided by 
the use of legal fictions such as that which allowed the development 
of the action on the case of trespass, providing a remedy which met 
the needs of the conflicting parties and the wishes of the judiciary. It 
is against this background that we must consider the way in which the 
development of the action on the case emerged, as a means of 
providing a much needed legal remedy for breach of promise. 
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2. The nature of legal liability 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 The origins of both contract and tort lie in the same area of law, 
which is the action on the case of trespass. However, the two legal 
remedies developed along different lines, providing the modern day 
contrast in the nature of the legal liability. 
2.1.2 The action on the case originally developed from the action for 
trespass. Trespass was a wrong as its name implies (as from the 
Latin 'transgressio'), and as such it had quasi-criminal connotations. 
Originally such cases would only be heard in the royal courts if there 
was a threat to the king's peace because of the use of violence. This 
involved the claim that the defendant had acted 'contra pacem' or 
against the peace. In many cases the wrong was caused by the 
negligent actions of the defendant, and the claim that this was 'contra 
pacem' was a fiction designed to bring the case before the royal 
courts, which the plaintiffs often preferred to local courts (3). The 
reason for the injury would not be clear in a case of negligence, as 
opposed to wilful action, so it was necessary to outline the facts in 
more detail. This was done by means of a special clause which was 
the origin of the action on the case of trespass and became a 
specialised form of writ in its own right. 
Page 21 
2.1.3 By the late 14th century the need to prove 'contra pacem' had 
ceased, but the action on the case had emerged as a quite separate 
action from trespass. Whilst trespass involved direct forcible injury, 
the action on the case involved misfeasance (or wrongdoing) by the 
defendant, which was sometimes wilful, but was usually the result of 
negligence. This liability often arose out of a prior agreement between 
plaintiff and defendant to carry out some task and as such has much 
in common with modern day actions for professional negligence. This 
can be seen in the case of BUCKTON v TOWNSEND (THE HUMBER 
FERRYMAN) 1348 where the liability arose from the defendant's 
negligent performance of an agreed task. Here the liability was 
essentially reliance based (4), and related to the loss caused to the 
plaintiff as a result of his reliance on the defendant. However, there 
was an aspect of assumed responsibility, which would become a 
central feature in the development of assumpsit from which contract 
law emerged. 
2.2 Development of assumpsit 
2.2.1 The development of assumpsit as a legal remedy was due to 
the inadequacies of the existing remedies for breach of a promise, 
which lay in covenant, debt and detinue. An action in covenant was 
the main form of remedy for breach of promise, but this had to be 
evidenced by way of deed, and in any case did not provide adequate 
damages as it would not compensate for loss of bargain. The 
alternative actions for debt and detinue did not require written 
evidence but were subject to judgement by 'Wager of Law' which was 
disliked by many plaintiffs. Moreover, the remedy was limited in scope 
and did not cover loss of bargain. 
Page 22 
2.2.2 The action on the case avoided all of these problems. It covered 
misfeasance by the defendant but did not require any special proof. 
The action was decided by jury trial and the damages for injury were 
flexible enough to cover loss of bargain. The action of assumpsit 
developed from the action on the case and was confined to situations 
where a pre-existing arrangement had been created between the two 
parties. The essence of the action was that the defendant undertook 
to do something (assumpsit) but had performed this task negligently. 
This involved an amalgam of modern day contractual and tortious 
concepts which can be seen in some of the earliest assumpsit cases. 
In the SURGEONS CASE (1364), for example, it was alleged that... 
'...(R) having undertaken the aforesaid cure and having received 
part of the aforesaid fee in hand, so carelessly negligently or 
maliciously performed his cure ...that (the plaintifO completely 
lost her aforesaid hand by the fault...' (5). 
2.2.3 It can be seen that at this stage the liability was essentially 
reliance based, in other words, it was related to the fact that the 
plaintiff had relied upon the defendant to perform his task properly 
and had been injured due to the negligence of the defendant. In 
effect, there was a duty of care on the defendant to act without 
negligence. However, it is also clear that liability was related to a prior 
agreement (6), and this agreement could become the source of an 
alternative promise based liability. 
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2.2.4 The reason for the move to a promise based liability from a 
reliance based liability were the limitations of the assumpsit action. 
Although it would cover misfeasance, it would not lie in cases of non 
feasance (or non-performance) as shown by WATTON v BRINTH 
(1400) (7). Yet it is difficult to distinguish between the two, as in the 
minds of the parties involved there was little difference between 
performing an act badly and not performing it at all; both were 
essentially seen as a wrong. 
2.2.5 In order to deal with this problem assumpsit developed the 
concept of deceit. Liability was based on the idea that the plaintiff had 
relied upon a promise which had turned out to be false as in DIOGES 
CASE (1442) (8). Although the liability was still seen as reliance 
based, it was now reliance upon a promise, rather than the 
performance of an action (9). The promise provided the formal basis 
of the liability, but the duty was still seen as linked to misfeasance, 
the defendant having committed a wrong. 
2.2.6 Essentially the action for deceit provided a bridge between 
liability based on a duty to act without negligence, and liability based 
on a breach of promise (10). By the late 16th century the focus had 
switched from the breach of duty to the breach of the promise, and 
such a promise need not be express but could be implied from the 
initial agreement, as in MANWOOD v BURSTON (1587) (11). During 
the next century, the action of assumpsit became the main remedy for 
breach of informal promises, superceding the actions in covenant and 
debt (12). By the 18th century the courts had begun to allow actions 
for breach of future promises with the development of executory 
contracts, effectively signalling the break with the idea of liability 
related to performance alone (13). 
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2.2.7 The main problem with the action for assumpsit was that it was 
a difficult concept to limit. The idea of liability for breach of promise 
was a powerful one, but it would become unworkable if applied to all 
promises. It was seen as necessary to limit assumpsit to certain types 
of promises where there was a clear intention to be legally bound. In 
English law this was effected by means of the doctrines of 
consideration and privity of contract. 
2.2.8 The doctrine of consideration required that only certain types of 
promises could be enforceable and this was where the other party 
had given something in return (14). By the end of the 18th century the 
existence of consideration was seen as essential to the enforceability 
of a contract as stated in RANN v HUGHES (1778) (15), where Lord 
Mansfield's idea of moral obligation was decisively rejected. The idea 
that mutual exchange was the basis of legally enforceability of 
contracts, seems to have been firmly accepted by the 19th century 
when consideration was seen as the linchpin of contractual liability 
(16). This differentiated the English and Common law systems from 
the civil law system in the rest of Europe, where the idea of a moral 
basis for legal liability was preferred. 
2.2.9 The doctrine of privity of contract arose later and can be seen 
as a logical development from the doctrine of consideration. As 
liability in contract now centred on the exchange of promises, it could 
be argued that only the parties who had made a promise could 
enforce the contract, and not third parties. Nevertheless, the position 
was uncertain until the key decision of TWEDDLE v ATKINSON 
(1861) (17) which finally decided in favour of the privity rule. Possibly 
the actual decision was actually based on consideration rather than 
privity (18); but the case was seen as decided on the basis of lack of 
privity, and this interpretation was the one which became the 
accepted view by the time of DUNLOP v SELFRIDGE (1915) 
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2.2.10 By the 19th century, the basic elements of contractual liability 
had been established, and they were honed into a logical theory of 
obligation by academic writers; often referred to as the 'classical' 
contract law theory. Contractual liability was seen as being based on 
the mutual will of the contracting parties, as well as being related to 
the exchange of promises (20). This linked in with the prevailing 
political and economic theory of 'laissez faire' which encouraged the 
idea that contracting parties should be left to determine their own 
legal liability. As a result, the concept of 'freedom of contract' 
emerged, by which the courts became more reluctant to intervene in 
defining contractual liability. This meant that the liability in contract 
was often strict and related to the express terms of the contract rather 
than any external idea of fairness. Moreover, the requirements of the 
doctrines of privity and consideration could cause considerable 
problems, limiting the ability of some parties to obtain a remedy in 
contract law and forcing them to turn to alternative remedies. 
2.3 Development of the tort of Negligence 
2.3.1 The evolution of assumpsit in the 16th century had a profound 
effect on the development of the action on the case. Many of the 
original actions on the case had involved prior agreements and these 
now became part of assumpsit. This left only those actions where no 
prior agreement existed, such as wilful actions, or negligent actions 
by specific groups of persons such as common carriers or persons in 
charge of animals (21). 
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2.3.2 The further development of this area was complicated by 
several key issues. The main problem was the confusion between the 
boundaries of trespass and the action on the case. The former 
covered direct injury, and the latter, indirect or consequential injury. 
In reality it was often difficult to decide into which action a situation 
fell, yet if the plaintiff initiated the wrong cause of action he would 
suffer a non suit. The problem was resolved by the decision in 
WILLIAMS V HOLLAND (1833) (22) which finally allowed both types 
of injury to be brought under the action on the case (23). 
2.3.3 A second problem was that the courts focused on the actions 
of the plaintiff to see if he could have avoided the injury, rather than 
considering whether the defendant had been negligent. It was not 
until the 19th century and the emergence of dangerous activities 
relating to mechanised industry and transport, that the focus switched 
to the actions of the defendant (24). As a result, it was in the 19th 
century that we see the beginnings of a general tort of negligence, 
based on the idea of a duty of care, arising from the original idea of 
liability for misfeasance (25). This can be seen most clearly in cases 
against utility companies such as BLYTH v BIRMINGHAM 
WATERWORKS Co. (1856)(26). 
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2.3.4 However, it is arguable that the main problem was that the 
courts were unwilling to impose legal liability in respect of parties who 
were not in a contractual relationship, and in the latter case would 
expect an action to be brought in contract. The courts restricted 
actions for negligence by means of the 'privity of contract fallacy' 
dating from WINTERBOTTOM v WRIGHT (1842) (27), which claimed 
that an action in tort could not be brought where there was an existing 
contractual relationship. In effect, the courts preferred parties to resort 
to contractual remedies where a contract existed and were prepared 
to find contractual liability in cases which we would now see as tort 
based such as the classic case of CARLILL v CARBOLIC 
SMOKEBALL CO. (1893) (28). In the case of employees, actions for 
negligence were restricted by the doctrine of 'common employment' 
which saw personal injury as one of the risks of the job and therefore 
implied into the contract. The key problem was that the stronger party 
could often impose onerous conditions on the other party and exclude 
or limit his own liability. 
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2.3.5 The development of tortious liability was an attempt to bypass 
the limitations of the contract law approach, and its success was a 
reflection of the growing power of consumers and employees. 
Consumers who sought remedies from the manufacturer of defective 
goods turned to the tort of negligence and finally succeeded in the 
seminal case of DONAGHUE v STEVENSON (1932). This case 
exploded the 'privity of contract fallacy' and formulated a general 
theory of liability based on the 'Neighbour Principle' as laid down by 
Lord Atkin. Employees were also able to use the tortious action for 
personal injury as the courts undermined the doctrine of common 
employment and limited the defence of volenti (29). In this way, the 
growth of negligence cases marked a key development in the use of 
tortious actions to avoid the limitations of contract law, particularly in 
the case of weaker parties who could not expect to negotiate 
adequate contractual protection. It also allowed the courts to import 
its own ideas of fairness and justice instead of adopting the 'laissez 
faire' approach of contract law. 
2.4 Conclusion 
2.4.1 Overall, we can see that contract and tort originated from the 
same area of law and were originally reliance based types of liability 
related to the misfeasance of the defendant. In order to accommodate 
the need for a remedy for non feasance, the action of assumpsit 
developed from the action on the case, with a liability based on the 
mutual exchange of promises. Essentially the legal basis of the two 
actions remained the same in that they related to the idea of a wrong. 
The breach of a duty was a wrong, as was the breach of a promise. 
Although these two different aspects of liability could lead in different 
directions, there remained an element of interrelationship which still 
causes problems in defining the modern boundary between contract 
and tort. 
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2.4.2 I now wish to look at how the historical development of contract 
and tort has impacted upon the nature and scope of the liability as 
well as the extent of the remedy. 
3. The nature of the liability 
3.1 Contract Law 
3.1.1 The original nature of liability in assumpsit was fault based, 
reflecting its link to misfeasance. This continued to be the case, even 
with the move away from reliance on the conduct to reliance on the 
promise, as breach of the promise was seen as a wrong or alternative 
form of misfeasance. However, the development of the idea of mutual 
exchange of promise in the 17th century, with the emergence of 
consideration, meant that the exchange of promises became the 
mainspring of liability rather than any idea of fault, and this tended to 
lead to strict liability as the promises of the parties were meant to be 
strictly enforced. 
3.1.2 Nevertheless, it would be true to say that a conflict continued to 
exist in contract between fault based and strict liability. The fault 
based liability remained with the idea that contract was still partly 
based on reliance rather than mutual exchange of contract promises 
(30). In this respect the contracting parties could expect the other to 
perform the contract and would rely on that performance. The 
alternative view was that contract was essentially promise based 
liability which meant that the nature of liability would be strict, 
modified only by mistake, frustration or implied term. This was seen 
as being the way that 'classical' contract law operated in the 19th 
century (31). 
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3.1.3 Yet the idea of fault based liability is related to the ideas of 
fairness and reasonableness which have always existed in contract 
law, even in its classical phase. Such aspects as the imposition of fair 
prices for services predated the imposition of statutory protection (32). 
In the 19th century the courts would often strike down contracts seen 
as oppressive where they affected minors or persons acting under 
duress. Yet it was possible for this attitude to run 'hand in hand' with 
a more 'laissez faire' approach in respect of contracts entered into 
between other parties. This is reflected in the famous quotation of Sir 
George Jessell in PRINTING & NUMERICAL REGISTERING Co v 
SAMPSON (1875) where he stated.... 
'...if there is one thing more than another which public policy 
requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding 
shall have the utmost liberty in contracting, and that their 
contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held 
sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of Justice' (33). 
3.1.4 In reality, the courts tended to take into consideration the power 
of the parties involved. Stronger parties, or parties who were 
contracting on an equal footing, were always likely to have to comply 
with the strict requirements of the contract; whereas the courts were 
ready to protect weaker parties by not imposing a strict liability but 
allowing them to avoid the contract on the basis that they had not 
freely entered into it (34). However, the number and categories of 
weaker parties was much more limited in the 19th century and did not 
usually include employees or consumers. 
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3.2 The tort of Negligence 
3.2.1 The removal of assumpsit actions from actions on the case, 
meant that what remained of the tort of trespass related to indirect 
damage where there was no element of prior agreement. Liability 
here was often strict and linked to specific liability for particular 
groups of defendants such as owners of animals. The tendency of the 
court to consider how the risk occurred, rather than to focus on the 
action of the defendant, could lead to the imposition of strict liability 
as in RYLANDS v FLETCHER (1856) (35). 
3.2.2 The move to a fault based liability was a development of the 
19th century as the focus of the liability in the action on the case 
began to switch to the actions of the defendant. The development of 
the concept of the duty of care was linked to the idea of the 
reasonable man and this became the basis upon which the nature of 
the liability was based. This concept was first developed in cases 
such as BLYTH v BIRMINGHAM WATERWORKS CO. (1856) where 
negligence was defined by Alderson B as follows... 
'..the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided 
upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct 
of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent 
and reasonable man would not do' (36) 
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3.2.3 The nature of the liability was also conditioned by the greater 
willingness of the court to balance the risks involved against the 
benefit to the community, so focusing upon the value to society of the 
defendant's actions. These factors would also be considered in 
determining whether liability should lie, and so the idea of 
reasonableness incorporated a wider aspect than the reasonable man 
but imported into this an element of the law's concept of whether the 
activity was valuable to society as a whole. In addition, it became 
acceptable to consider extraneous factors such as the nature of the 
danger posed by the activity and the ability of the defendant to protect 
himself by means of insurance. This is a trend which has led to the 
greater willingness of courts to impose liability on more powerful 
parties such as manufacturers and employers. 
3.3 Conclusions 
3.3.1 In the development of both contract and the tort of negligence, 
we can see the tension between fault based and strict based liability. 
Although in general, contract tended to the former and negligence to 
the latter, there was always an element of both types of liability in 
contract and tort. This allowed the courts to impose their own ideas 
of fairness in both areas of law and tended to mean that they could, 
if necessary, intervene on the part of the weaker party. The nature of 
the liability often owed more to the nature of the parties and the 
circumstances involved, than to the type of legal action commenced. 
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4 The scope of the liability 
4.1 Contract Law 
4.1.1 The position as regards the scope of liability is a logical 
development from the nature of liability. The strict nature of 
contractual liability could only be upheld if it was the prime source of 
liability. This was achieved by the development of the 'privity of 
contract' fallacy which prevented parties outflanking contractual 
liability by resorting to tortious actions. The collapse of this doctrine 
in the mid 19th century led to the rise of concurrent liability which 
threw into focus the differences between contract and tort, and drew 
attention to the limitations of the contractual remedy in particular. 
Moreover, the ability of contracting parties to limit or exclude liability 
for breach of the duty of care was controlled by the use of statute 
such as the UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS ACT 1977. 
4.1.2 The problem was exacerbated by the failure to allow the use of 
tortious principles such as contributory negligence, which were clearly 
relevant to duty of care type situations. The doctrine of common 
employment prevented actions for breach of the duty of care by 
imposing a strict limitation on the liability of the employer. However, 
once that restriction was overcome in tort, it was impossible to 
maintain it in contract. As a result, the courts had to consider whether 
the employee had a corresponding duty of care, and imported thus 
the idea of contributory negligence. In consumer actions against 
manufacturers this would be reflected in the limitation of damages. 
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4.2 The tort of Negligence 
4.2.1 The tortious remedy expanded to meet the needs of litigants 
who sought to outflank the limitations of contract law. New areas of 
liability were developed, such as Negligent Misstatement, which often 
replicated liability in contract. The rapid development of such areas 
of liability has served to put pressure on contract law in order to 
remove some of its more restrictive aspects, especially the rule on 
privity. 
4.3 Conclusion 
4.3.1 The development of concurrent liability in the present century 
has done much to undermine the separate areas of contract and tort. 
As such it has become impossible in many cases to determine which 
action should have priority. In areas such as employment law, where 
concurrent liability has long been established, the expansion of 
tortious liability has effectively driven the expansion of the contractual 
one. This can be seen in the emergence of the contractual action for 
loss of opportunity in SCALLY v SOUTHERN HEALTH AND SOCIAL 
SERVICES BOARD (1991) (37). 
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5. Extent of the Liability 
5.1 Contract Law 
5.1.1 Originally, liability in contract law lay in respect of the injury or 
damage caused, and so the extent of the liability was also related to 
the recompense for such injury. In effect, the liability was reliance 
based and so the damages claimed related to the losses directly 
incurred as a result of the non performance or bad performance of the 
promise. However, as we have seen, one of the advantages of the 
writ of assumpsit was that it was possible to claim wider damages 
than the action for covenant or debt and these covered consequential 
damages rather than mere reimbursement. As such, they could 
include within them an element of compensation for loss of bargain. 
Page 36 
5.1.2 The move to a promise based liability meant that it was possible 
to detach the concept of damages from the specific injury and to 
move to wider expectation damages. This can be seen in the case of 
ORWELL V MORTOFT (1505) (38), a case involving non feasance, 
where it was possible to recover damages for loss of bargain. With 
the emergence of the executory contract in the 18th century, it 
became possible to claim compensation in respect of failure to 
perform a future action, where the damages were of course more 
speculative. Some academics see such a development dating from 
the 16th century (39) whereas others would look to the end of the 
18th century or the 19th (40) with a case like GAINSFORD v 
CARROLL (1824) (41) allowing for expectation loss as we would now 
define it. The fact that many contracts disputed at law would be 
business contracts, where a party could expect to contract for future 
resale, may have been an important factor here; whilst the rise of 
credit based deals would also lead to a need to provide compensation 
related to future expectations. In particular, Simpson sees the cases 
arising from the South Sea Bubble debacle as important in developing 
the trend to expectation losses (42). 
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5.1.3 In addition to the development of expectation losses, the courts 
increasingly saw the losses as being determined according to the 
contemplation of the parties involved, rather than based on any notion 
of reasonableness or fairness (43). This reflected the idea that the 
basis of contractual liability was the promise of the parties and so 
they should be able to define the extent of their own liability. This 
linked in to the 19th century idea of 'freedom of contract' and the 
unwillingness of the courts to intervene with contractual terms. In 
HADLEY V BAXEDALE (1854) (44), it was made clear that the 
remoteness rule in respect of damages was to cover naturally arising 
losses or those within the reasonable contemplation of the parties. 
However, whilst the courts would tend to find the level of damages 
related to the contemplation of the parties in most cases, they could 
impose damages related to reliance loss or losses similar to 
reasonable foreseeability as in KOUFOS v CZARNIKOW (THE 
HERON II) (1969) (45). 
5.2 The Tort of Negligence 
5.2.1 Here the damages initially awarded in the action on the case 
were for the injury or loss, including consequential losses. In this area 
of law the courts decided the extent of the damages, and they tended 
to award damages to cover the reasonably foreseeable losses in the 
case of negligence, which would include non pecuniary loss such as 
loss of amenity, and distress. However, these would not extend to 
expectation loss which was seen as the prerogative of contract law. 
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5.2.2 The main complication came in the 20th century with the 
development of liability for deceit and misrepresentation. Here the 
loss incurred by the plaintiff could include expectation losses. In 
recent cases, the courts have begun to award damages to cover such 
losses within the scope of all consequential losses as in EAST v 
MAURER (1981) (46). The problem is related to the flexibility of the 
term 'consequential losses' which was available from the earliest 
cases of misfeasance. Such a term is capable of a wide interpretation 
and can be expanded to cover losses which may be seen as 
essentially expectation losses. In this way it reflects the position in the 
earliest misfeasance cases where the extent of the liability was 
similarly extensive. 
5.3 Conclusion 
5.3.1 If we look at the extent of the remedies we can see how easy 
it is for confusion to arise. The idea of consequential loss or even 
reasonably foreseeable loss is a vague concept, which can easily 
allow for pure expectation losses. In that respect, we can see how the 
extent of damages in contract and tort has become increasingly 
similar (47). 
5.3.2 The similarity of the extent of the remedy in contract and tort 
owes much to the confusion as to the nature of the liability. In both 
contract and tort there is an element of reliance based liability and 
this allows for similar levels of damages. Similarly, the wide extent of 
the damages available in early misfeasance cases allows for a wide 
interpretation of loss, and so allows both contract and tort to develop 
damages which cover expectation losses. 
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6. Overall Analysis 
6.1 Historical Origins 
6.1.1 If we look at the historical development of contract and tort law, 
we can see how the present confusion has arisen as to the boundary 
between the two areas of law. At all stages there has been a close 
interrelationship between contract and tort, as regards the nature of 
liability, the scope of liability and the extent of the remedy. In this 
respect, it is wrong to see contract and tort as two completely distinct 
areas of law, but rather as different elements in a general law of civil 
obligation. The idea that contract law was a completely distinct type 
of law, is largely a result of the fact that it was given an ideological 
and theoretical framework in the 19th century, which happened to 
coincide with the period of maximum differentiation between the two 
areas of law. 
6.1.2 We can see that contract and tort developed from the same 
basis of liability, this being a wrong committed by the defendant, 
originally by way of misfeasance and then by non feasance. Although 
the basis of the liability in contract moved from the injury to the 
promise made, in both contract and tort the nature of the injury or loss 
still remained the key element in the liability. Unlike civil law 
jurisdictions, English law never fully developed the idea that contract 
law obligation was based on a moral imperative; instead, the idea of 
mutual exchange of promise underlies the legal liability, and ties it 
indirectly to the performance or non performance of the task. 
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6.2 Consequences for contemporary law 
6.2.1 The consequences of this historical interrelationship can be 
seen in the confusion between contract and tort, as regards the 
nature of the liability and the extent of the remedy. In all cases, we 
can see that the idea of fairness is imported into contract and tort as 
it reflects the idea of remedying a wrong, the issue which lies at the 
heart of the action on the case. Moreover, the same confusion exists 
in the uncertainty over the extent of the remedy, where the traditional 
distinction between contractual and tortious damages is becoming 
difficult to sustain. This is a reflection of the fact that the two areas of 
law are essentially trying to remedy a similar type of wrong, namely 
the misfeasance of the defendant, which is difficult to distinguish from 
non feasance. 
6.2.2 During the last few years the boundary between contract and 
tort has seemed to come under strain. This is partly because the 
boundary was never clearly defined in the first place. It also reflects 
the resurgence of tortious liability to fill the gap left by the inability of 
'classical' contract law to meet the needs of weaker parties such as 
consumers and employees. Finally, it reflects the change in our 
underlying ideologies, which we referred to in the introduction, with its 
greater emphasis on externally imposed norms, an aspect which more 
closely reflects the principles of tortious liability. The key factor here 
is the perception of the role of contract and tort; what their function 
was, and what it should be. In this respect we need to consider the 
underlying ideologies upon which contract law and tort appear to be 
based. 
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Chapter 3 
THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF CONTRACT AND TORT 
1. Introduction 
1.1 General Overview 
1.1.1 In order to understand the way in which contract and tort differ 
from each other, it is essential to understand their underlying 
ideological basis. This is to some extent derived from the historical 
origins of the different areas of law, but it is also a reflection of 
modern day ideas of morality and justice and their impact on legal 
liability. In this respect, such underlying ideologies must always be 
subject to change and development, which means that perceptions of 
the role of law will also change. 
1.1.2 What we need to be aware of, in defining an ideological 
framework into which to fit the law, is that we are really answering two 
questions. We are stating 'this is how the law is', in other words this 
is why the courts come to a particular decision; and we are also 
stating 'this is how the law should be'. This confusion between 'is' and 
'ought' underlies a great deal of writing on ideological concepts and 
it can be difficult to distinguish between the two. In this thesis I would 
like to consider whether the particular area of law does correspond 
with a particular ideological concept and then go on to state whether 
I think it should be so. 
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1.1.3 In considering the ideological concepts we can distinguish 
between instrumental and non instrumental ideologies. The former 
seeks to relate the purpose of the law to a specific societal purpose, 
whereas the latter does not have such external aims, although it may 
be based on a coherent moral framework. I would argue here that the 
courts tend to base their decision on one of two underlying 
instrumentalist ideologies. 
1.2 The two Ideological approaches 
1.2.1 The first type is concerned with the idea of functional efficiency 
of the economic system and involves two different strands. On the 
one hand, there is the so-called 'Law and Economics' school of 
thought represented by academics such as Posner, Kronman, Harris 
and Veljanowski (1). Their ideas are based on the belief that the legal 
process should operate to ensure the maximisation of wealth in 
society and the minimisation of cost. Their main concern is to ensure 
that resources are not wasted by parties having to incur excessive 
'transaction costs'. This includes making unnecessary contracts or 
incurring excessive insurance, as a result of the need to obtain 
adequate information and to arrange the necessary financial cover. 
The second strand is the idea that legal liability should be related to 
the needs of business. This is particularly so of contract law where 
this approach is referred to as the 'market individualist' approach by 
Adams and Brownsword (2). 
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1.2.2 In both cases, there is a greater concern for the interests of 
business parties and the more effective functioning of the market. 
There is a basic belief that the parties are best able to protect their 
own interests, and there is little concern with other societal aims such 
as burden spreading or the distribution of power and wealth. It is not 
true to say that this approach is amoral as such, but there is certainly 
a belief that the state should not seek to impose external moral ideas 
where they conflict with the reasonable expectations of business 
parties. In effect, the moral underpinning is much more individualistic 
in nature. 
1.2.3 The second type of instrumentalist theory is that which seeks to 
consider the impact of legal decisions in relation to the economic 
power of the parties. This has been referred to by Adams and 
Brownsword as the 'Consumer Welfarist' approach, or by Collins as 
'Communitarianism'(3). The essence of this approach is that the law 
should take into consideration the economic power of the parties 
involved, to ensure that the law does not impose too great a burden 
on the weaker party. In effect, it is based on the ideas of distributive 
justice, whereby the losses incurred are loaded onto the shoulders of 
the party best able to bear them, or redistributed amongst society as 
a whole through the medium of insurance. This approach is sceptical 
of the benefits of an unregulated market place, and sees the needs 
for intervention by the state to ensure a fairer result by means of 
legislative action, or if necessary the action of the courts. As such this 
type of approach can be seen as based on a moral imperative which 
is related to the perceived needs of society, rather than the more 
individualist morality of the first approach. 
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1.2.4 For ease of identification I propose to refer to these two main 
approaches as respectively 'efficiency orientated' and 'socially 
orientated'. I realise that these are not mutually exclusive approaches 
and that there is considerable overlap between them. For example, 
it could be argued that the reasonable expectation of business parties 
would include the belief that a weaker party should not be taken 
advantage of by an unscrupulous party in a stronger position. 
However, I would argue that these are essentially distinct approaches 
and underlie the way in which academics and practitioners approach 
the idea of legal liability in contract and tort. 
1.2.5 In the rest of this chapter I would like to analyse how these 
different approaches impact upon contract and tort, in respect of the 
nature of the liability, the scope of the liability and the extent of the 
remedy. I will then seek to consider to what extent contract and tort 
differ in the way these approaches impact on the liability of the 
respective parties. 
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2. The efficiency orientated approach 
2.1 The Nature of the liability 
2.1.1 This approach can lead to complex variations as regards the 
nature of liability. In contract, the liability is seen as based on the 
exchange of promises between individual parties, as in this manner 
they define their liability to each other and also the risks they wish to 
take. The efficiency orientated approach seeks, amongst other things, 
to minimise transaction costs. Therefore it should be possible for 
contracting parties to define rights and liabilities in respect of third 
parties, which can be enforced by them. This also accords with the 
reasonable expectations of business parties who see contract as a 
means of allocating risk. This approach is at variance with the 
doctrine of privity, which requires contracting parties to make 
additional contracts to provide sufficient cover. In complex contractual 
arrangements such as construction projects, we have a system of 
interlocking contracts where rights and liabilities are defined, an 
arrangement referred to as a 'network contract' (4). This system 
cannot function effectively if we have a strict privity rule, and so 
courts taking the efficiency orientated approach have been ready to 
relax the rules here. 
2.1.2 The efficiency orientated approach also tends to play down the 
traditional concern for consideration, where this does not accord with 
the reasonable expectations of business parties. This attitude can be 
seen in the view taken by the courts in the recent decision in 
WILLIAMS V ROFFEY BROTHERS (1990) (5). This also incorporates 
the idea that business parties do not usually wish to enforce the strict 
requirements of law, but instead rely upon the goodwill of other 
business parties to ensure that they do not renege on agreements (6). 
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2.1.3 The type of liability in contract law is more likely to be strict 
under the efficiency orientated approach, as there is a greater 
concern for certainty in commercial arrangements. The view is that 
the parties should be allowed to allocate liability in the way which is 
most cost effective to themselves, and this can only be achieved if the 
operation of the market is the key determinant, not the intervention of 
the state through the medium of the courts. However, the efficiency 
orientated approach will be prepared to allow the overriding of the 
strict requirements in the contract, where they are seen as being so 
unreasonable as to no longer accord with the reasonable expectations 
of business parties. This can be seen as a factor underlying the 
decision in INTERFOTO v STILETTO VISUAL PRODUCTS (1988) 
(7). 
2.1.4 When we consider the position in tort, the law and economics 
model tends to focus upon a form of cost benefit analysis. The basis 
of liability is usually taken as the formula laid down by Judge Learned 
Hand in the case of UNITED STATES v CARROLL TOWING CO. 
(1947) (8). This involves a mathematical computation of the cost and 
risk, whereby the defendant will only incur liability if the expected cost 
of the accident, multiplied by the probability of it occurring, exceeds 
the cost of avoidance. This basis of liability is an economic one, and 
is based on considerations of functional efficiency involving the 
ultimate goal of maximisation of wealth in society. This approach will 
take into consideration extraneous factors such as the availability of 
insurance cover, and can thus undermine any sense of moral 
obligation by loading the loss onto the least-cost option. However, it 
is very difficult to precisely calculate the costs and risks, so that the 
courts are unwilling to operate this model in practice but fall back on 
more limited aims, such as deterrence of the individual tortfeasor, 
which allows for an element of moral approbation. 
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2.2 The Scope of the Liability 
2.2.1 In this approach, the definition of liability will be the prerogative 
of contract, as this most clearly identifies the intentions of the parties 
involved. The efficiency orientated approach is essentially market 
driven, and will see the contract model as having a clear superiority 
over the tortious one, because it allows the parties to define their own 
liabilities, rather than this being done by the state. In theory, it should 
be possible for the state to effect an efficient allocation of resources 
by imposing its own ideas of efficiency, but the proponents of the 
market driven approach tend to see the contracting parties as more 
capable of performing this task. As a result, contract will be allocated 
a position of primacy, and tortious principles such as contributory 
negligence will be excluded from the domain of contract. 
2.2.2 When we consider the area of tort then there is a greater 
willingness to allow the influence of external ideas of efficiency as 
outlined above. However, this approach is often not followed by the 
courts who find it difficult to determine their own definition of efficiency 
and instead fall back on ideas of corrective or distributive justice. 
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2.3 The Extent of the Remedy 
2,3.1 The extent of the remedy in contract law will tend to follow the 
expectations of the parties, in much the same way as the traditional 
framework. This approach allows for an appreciation of the impact 
upon commercial contracting and the relative expectations of the 
parties in respect of the bearing of losses. This can be seen in the 
case of PHOTO PRODUCTION v SECURICOR (1980) (9), where the 
court upheld the validity of a limitation clause, because it would avoid 
catastrophic damages being Imposed upon a party who was only 
obtaining a limited payment under the contract. This decision was 
seen as being based on the commercial realities of business 
contracting as per the words of Lord Wilberforce; 
'...the nature of the contract has to be understood. Securicor 
undertook to provide a service of periodical visits for a very 
modest charge....In these circumstances nobody could consider 
it unreasonable that as between these two equal parties the risk 
assumed by Securicor should be a modest one, and that Photo 
Productions should carry the substantial risk of damage or 
destruction' (10). 
2.3.2 Where the suppliers of the goods or service are seen as being 
in a better position to provide insurance cover, then the courts may 
be unwilling to allow them to rely on exclusion or limitation clauses. 
Instead they will impose full liability upon them, including expectation 
losses, as in GEORGE MITCHELL v FINNEY LOCK SEEDS (1983) 
(11). In both of these cases the key underlying philosophy is that the 
commercial realities of the situation should determine where liability 
should fall and the extent of the remedy available. 
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2.3.3 The position in tort as regards the law and economics model is 
that the damages should be based on the need to reduce the overall 
cost to society. This can lead to a balancing of the costs and benefits 
involved, as imposing excessive liability on one party would lead to 
excessive insurance cover being sought or a tendency to discourage 
necessary risk taking. Yet it is also argued that damages could be 
imposed on parties to influence future behaviour, on the basis that 
this will be to the overall benefit of society (12). In this respect there 
is an element of deterrence built into the system. 
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3. The Socially Orientated approach 
3.1 The Nature of the Liability 
3.1.1 In contract law, the nature of the liability is based upon the 
agreement between the parties, but in this approach the concern of 
the law is to ensure that the parties deal fairly with each other. This 
means that there is a greater willingness to intervene in the drawing 
up of the contract, both in terms of implying in terms and preventing 
one party from using onerous terms at the expense of the other. The 
underlying concern is to ensure that one party does not obtain an 
unfair advantage because of superior bargaining power (13). This 
approach can be seen most clearly in the case of SCHROEDER 
MUSIC PUBLISHING Co. LTD v McCAULEY (1974) in respect of a 
clause seeking to restrain the freedom of the weaker party. Here the 
court's position was summarised by Lord Diplock as follows; 
'..The fact that the appellants' bargaining power vis-a-vis the 
respondent was strong enough to enable them to adopt this 
take-it-or-leave-it attitude raises no presumption that they used 
it to drive an unconscionable bargain with him, but in the field 
of restraint of trade it calls for vigilance on the part of the court 
to see that they did not.' (14) 
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3.1.2 The socially orientated approach is more concerned with the 
issue of distributive fairness, rather than the idea of certainty or 
market efficiency. Again, there is a tendency to play down the 
importance of formalised rules such as privity or the need for 
consideration, if they obstruct the attainment of a fair result. The 
underlying concern is that the law should intervene where a party has 
suffered a wrong, but in deciding whether this is the case, the courts 
will be more concerned with issues of substantive fairness, rather 
than a simple analysis of the contractual position. 
3.1.3 With regard to the type of liability, this is more akin to fault 
based liability. This is achieved by implying terms into the contract 
which are based upon the court's requirements for fairness and 
reasonableness. As such it is the courts which determine the nature 
of the liability, not the contracting parties (15). We can see this in the 
key case of LIVERPOOL CITY COUNCIL v IRWIN (1976) where Lord 
Wilberforce stated the main reason for the decision to impose liability 
on the Council in the following terms; 
'...To imply an absolute obligation to repair would go beyond 
what is a necessary legal incident and would indeed be 
unreasonable. An obligation to take reasonable care to keep in 
reasonable repair and usability is what fits the requirements of 
the case. Such a definition involves...recognition that the 
tenants themselves have their responsibilities. What it is 
reasonable to expect of a landlord has a clear relation to what 
a reasonable set of tenants should do for themselves' (16). 
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3.1.4 Although it was argued in the case that the term was implied on 
the basis of 'necessity', it would seem that the real reason is to 
ensure that the contract is fair, in that the two parties have reasonable 
expectations placed upon them. The central underlying concept of 
reasonableness in this case has been acknowledged by Atiyah (17). 
3.1.5 In tort law, the liability is based on the need to rectify a wrong. 
The idea of a wrong derives from the concept of misfeasance here 
and provides a common link with contractual liability. The ability of the 
parties to determine their liability does not really exist in tort, because 
the liability is imposed by the law in order to achieve societal ends, 
rather than deriving from the terms of an agreement entered into by 
the two parties. But in the socially orientated approach, the difference 
is often not particularly clear, because there is a much greater 
willingness to intervene and imply terms into the contract in order to 
achieve similar societal ends. In this way, the basis of tortious liability 
and contractual liability is quite similar. 
Page 56 
3.1.6 The main societal end which this approach seeks to attain is 
distributive justice. This means that the law will try to ensure that 
parties do not have excessive liability imposed upon them, because 
they are in a weaker position. This involves a concern for loss 
spreading, to ensure that the burden is distributed to those parties 
who are in a stronger position or who have more financial resources. 
This is a factor behind the desire to impose near strict liability in 
motor accident claims as the liability will be born by the insurance 
company. As a result, this concern for distributive justice may conflict 
with ideas of corrective justice, by placing liability on the shoulders of 
parties who themselves are not really responsible for the wrong. A 
classic example is the employer, who is usually made liable for the 
wrongs of an employee under the doctrine of vicarious liability. The 
key concern here is to provide compensation for the injured plaintiff, 
rather than impose a financial penalty on the perpetrator. 
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3.2 The Scope of the Liability 
3.2.1 In contract law, the socially orientated approach will tend to 
allow a much greater intrusion of tortious based concepts such as 
reasonableness. As a result, there is a greater unwillingness to allow 
the contracting parties to rely upon exclusion or limitation clauses 
which are unfair or unreasonable. This has now found statutory 
expression in the UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS ACT 1977, but the 
same effect can be achieved by the courts arguing that the terms 
have not been incorporated into the contract. This approach can be 
seen in cases where contracting parties have sought to impose 
onerous terms upon the other party, and the courts have struck them 
down on the basis of lack of notice. Although this is the reason given 
for rejecting the term, it is clear that the underlying reason is a feeling 
that the term is unfair. An example is THORNTON v SHOE LANE 
PARKING (1971) where Lord Denning made clear his dislike of a term 
excluding liability for personal injury when he stated; 
'...I do not pause to enquire whether the exempting condition is 
void for unreasonableness. All I say is that it is so wide and so 
destructive of rights that the court should not hold any man 
bound by it unless it is drawn to his attention in the most explicit 
way' (18) 
3.2.2 It is arguable that this approach is more concerned with issues 
of fairness and reasonableness, rather than the specific terms of the 
contract. As a result, there is an unwillingness to be bound by 
exclusion or limitation clauses imposed by the stronger party. 
Similarly there is a greater readiness to allow the intrusion of tortious 
concepts such as contributory negligence. Consequently, the scope 
of contract law is limited and tortious principles are allowed to play an 
important part. 
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3.2.3 In tort, the socially orientated approach will also tend to focus 
on fault based liability, but also there is a desire to ensure the 
allocation of loss in a fair manner, so that it is concerned with issues 
of distributive justice. A key issue here will be the ability of the parties 
to provide alternative safeguards especially in contract (19). Where 
this is not possible, then there is a greater readiness to impose 
liability. This can be seen in cases involving liability for negligent 
misstatement, where the weaker party is more likely to succeed 
because it is not practical for him to have obtained alternative modes 
of protection, as in the case of SMITH v BUSH (1989) (20). 
3.3 Extent of the Remedy 
3.3.1 The extent of the remedy in contract law will be based on the 
idea of what is fair between the parties. This will tend towards 
awarding damages which are reliance based rather than expectation 
based. However, the courts will be prepared to award expectation 
damages if they think this is fair in the circumstances; and if the 
plaintiff is seen as likely to be involved in commercial activity, this will 
be more likely. In effect, the court will decide the extent of the liability, 
rather than looking at what was in the contemplation of the 
contracting parties, especially if the latter approach would give unfair 
advantage to a party with greater knowledge or bargaining power. 
3.3.2 The key problem here is that it is difficult to distinguish between 
the different types of damages awarded as reliance and expectation 
damages are often confused. Moreover, there is uncertainty over 
whether to compensate for the difference in value as opposed to the 
cost of cure as seen recently in the case of RUXLEY ELECTRONICS 
& CONSTRUCTION LTD v FORSYTH (1995) (21). 
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3.3.3 In the area of tort the socially orientated approach will usually 
lead to reliance based losses. However, these will be designed to 
compensate the plaintiff for the loss incurred, and so may involve a 
loss of profits, which means that it will cover expectation losses (22). 
Moreover, there will be a greater willingness to allow parties to claim 
for economic loss, where to deny this would place an unfair burden 
on the shoulders of the party involved. To this end, such an approach 
would tend to compensate the victims of negligent misstatement by 
valuers as in SMITH v BUSH (1989), but would not compensate 
corporate investors who incur losses due to negligent misstatement 
by auditors as in CAPARO v DICKMAN (1990) (23). The key factor 
here is the greater ability of the corporate investor to shoulder the 
burden or to have taken out adequate insurance. 
4. Conclusion 
4.1 Critique 
4.1.1 I would argue that the way in which legal decisions are made 
owes more to the specific ideological approach taken by the court, 
than to whether the action is brought in contract or tort. The two main 
ideological approaches which I have analysed in this chapter are 
common to both contract and tort and impact in different ways on the 
respective legal liabilities. However, both of these approaches have 
their own inherent weaknesses. 
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4.1.2 The efficiency orientated approach sees liability as dependent 
on the need to ensure the maximisation of wealth in society. In 
general, the tendency is to rely upon the market to achieve this result, 
rather than the state, and to a large extent this fits in with the 
traditional idea of contract law as being determined by the contracting 
parties alone. The problem is that too great a reliance on the will of 
the contracting parties can lead to unfair conditions being imposed on 
the weaker party involved. If this means that the whole area of 
contract law is seen as unfair, it would undermine the whole principle 
of contract law and as such respect for the idea of allowing parties to 
define their own legal rights and liabilities at all.(24) 
4.1.3 When we consider the socially orientated approach the focus 
moves to the result of the liability and there is much less willingness 
to rely upon the market. Instead it is left to the state to define liability, 
allowing it to impose its own ideas of fairness and reasonableness. 
The key problem here is defining what we mean by 'fairness' or 
'reasonableness', as these are inherently subjective concepts. In 
addition it also begs the question of how we define who is the 
'weaker' party when this concept too is relative. 
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4.2 The Attitude of the Courts 
4.2.1 I have sought to argue here, that the main reason for the 
differences in the nature and scope of liability and the extent of the 
remedy in contract and tort, owes more to the approach taken by the 
courts than to whether the case is brought in contract or tort. In the 
next two chapters I wish to consider two key areas of interest; these 
being contracts for services and contracts of service. Here I would like 
to analyse recent decisions to examine how the courts have 
approached the issues relating to the nature and extent of liability; 
and to see how, and if, they relate to a specific ideological approach. 
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Chapter 4 
THE APPROACH OF THE COURTS IN THE UK 
(1) CONTRACTS FOR SERVICES 
1. Introduction 
1.1 In the next two chapters, I wish to consider how the courts have 
dealt with the contract/tort divide in cases involving contracts for 
services and contracts of service. Although these two types of 
contract have significant differences, they also have key similarities 
which make them useful comparators. 
1.2 The key element here is that there is usually a contractual 
relationship existing between the parties who take legal action. It is 
now clear that the courts will accept a concurrent liability in contract 
and tort following HENDERSON v MERRETT (1994) (1). Moreover, 
in this case, it was also made clear that the duty of care in respect of 
negligent acts or statements, was essentially the same for contract 
and tort; 
'...it was an implied term (of the contract between the names 
and their agents) that the agents would exercise due care and 
skill...and that duty of care was no different from the duty of 
care owed by them to the names in tort' (2) 
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1.3 The main issue here is the interrelationship between contract and 
tort. The duty of care arises out of the contractual relationship, but is 
largely coterminous with the tortious duty of care. However, the 
position is more complicated where there is no direct contractual 
relationship, but the parties operate in a 'contractual nexus' such as 
that existing between a developer, the main contractor and any 
subcontractors. Here the courts may see the relationship as 'quasi-
contractual', and imply in contractual remedies and protection. 
1.4 The secondary issue is the nature of the relationship between the 
parties. In the case of a contract for services or a contract of service, 
it is possible to have parties with very similar levels of bargaining 
power or substantially different ones. This means that the courts are 
likely to tend towards favouring the weaker party if they adopt the 
socially orientated approach. 
1.5 In this chapter, I wish to look at the relationship between contract 
and tort in respect of contracts for services. I intend to use the 
tripartite analysis outlined in chapter 1; namely, the nature and scope 
of the liability, and the extent of the remedy. Yet we must always 
remember that these categories often overlap and we should not seek 
to segregate them too completely. 
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2. The Nature of the Liability 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 If we consider the traditional distinction between contract and 
tort, the key difference, as regards the nature of the liability, derives 
from the fact that contract is based on agreement between the parties 
and tortious liability is imposed by law. From this we can discern the 
distinguishing characteristics of contractual liability, which are the 
doctrine of privity, the need for consideration and the idea that 
contract enforces the free will of the parties so that liability will be 
strict. 
2.2 Doctrine of Privity 
2.2.1 This doctrine states that only the contracting parties can enforce 
the contract, and are able to obtain its benefits or are subject to its 
obligations. This restrictive approach has been subject to 
considerable criticism from the judiciary (3) and from academics (4). 
2.2.2 Yet, the reality in English law is that the privity doctrine has not 
been followed consistently as regards contracts for services. A classic 
example, is the concept of 'vicarious immunity", which arises in a 
situation where the plaintiffs and defendants do not have a direct 
contractual relationship, but are linked by means of a series of 
interlocking contracts. In this case, the defendant may be able to 
utilise an exclusion or limitation clause, provided for his benefit, in a 
contract to which he was not privy. This can be seen in the cases of 
SOUTHERN WATER AUTHORITY v CAREY (1985) (5) and 
NORWICH CITY COUNCIL v HARVEY (1989) (6). 
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2.2.3 These decisions have been justified on the grounds that there 
was a 'contractual setting', of which the plaintiff and the defendant 
were both aware, and which was seen by both as defining their rights 
and liabilities. This is referred to by Judge Smout in SOUTHERN 
WATER where he states; 
'...The contractual setting may not necessarily be overriding, but 
it is relevant in the consideration of the scope of the duty in tort 
for it indicates the extent of the liability which the plaintiffs 
predecessor wished to impose' (7) 
This position has been supported by academic opinion such as 
Adams and Brownsword and their concept of the 'network contract' 
(8). 
2.2.4 This relaxation of the privity doctrine was justified by the courts 
in the above decisions, on the grounds that it was 'just and 
reasonable'; but in fact such words merely mask a policy decision. 
The courts are motivated by an appreciation of the underlying 
commercial realities of the situation, including the knowledge and 
expectations of the parties involved, and a judgement as to whether 
the parties should have arranged appropriate insurance cover (9). It 
also involves an appreciation of the fact that all the parties were 
aware of the terms of the contracts involved, and reflects the view of 
the court that commercial parties should be able to protect their own 
interests accordingly. I would argue that the courts are effectively 
adopting an efficiency orientated approach here, by allocating liability 
according to commercially accepted norms. 
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2.2.5 The position is rather different where a party seeks to enforce 
a positive contractual term in a contract binding on the defendant, to 
which the plaintiff is not privy. Here the privity rule would prevent a 
right of action as in SIMAAN GENERAL CONTRACTING v 
PILKINGTON (1988) (10), although we arguably still have a 
contractual nexus. The inconsistency of this approach with the 
concept of 'vicarious immunity', has already been noted. (11) A 
similar situation occurred In the case of LEIGH & SILLAVAN LTD v 
ALIAKMON SHIPPING CO LTD (THE ALIAKMON) (1985) (12). Here 
the contractual nexus was seen as providing the opportunity for an 
alternative contractual remedy; and as the plaintiff had failed to take 
this, the court denied them a tortious remedy. 
2.2.6 Nevertheless, it is clear that the existence of a contractual 
nexus will not always negate liability in tort. The crucial Issue here 
seems to be the ability of the plaintiff to avail himself of any 
contractual remedy. Here the main criteria are likely to be the 
knowledge and bargaining power of the relevant parties. This is 
recognised by Stapleton in her article on the duty of care where she 
states; 
'...If a consistent attitude were to be adopted by courts in 
examining in every case what the plaintiff could reasonably 
have done to protect Itself, we would find that a substantial 
differential would emerge In the protection available in tort (and 
in terms implied by law) between plaintiffs who were ordinary 
private citizens and commercial plaintiffs with substantial 
bargaining power'. (13) 
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2.2.7 This argues that we have a bifurcated approach to legal liability, 
as regards the positive enforcement of a duty of care in a contract to 
which a party is not privy. This can be seen in the very different 
approach taken in THE ALIAKMON and the case of SMITH v BUSH 
(1989) (14). In both cases, the plaintiff sought to take a tortious action 
for breach of a duty of care which was expressly or impliedly stated 
in a contract to which they were not privy. In THE ALIAKMON, the 
tortious liability was negated because it was possible for the plaintiff 
to arrange alternative contractual protection. However, in SMITH v 
BUSH, which involved the purchase of a house by a non commercial 
party, their Lordships saw the plaintiff as effectively unable to secure 
that alternative protection. This point was made by Lord Templeman 
where he stated; 
'...In considering whether the exclusion clause may be relied on 
in each case, the general pattern of house purchases and the 
extent of the work and liability accepted by the valuer must be 
borne in mind....The building society, which is anxious to attract 
borrowers, and the purchaser who has no money to waste on 
valuation fees, do not encourage or pay for detailed surveys' 
(15) 
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2.2.8 The case of THE ALIAKMON was similar to SMITH v BUSH, in 
so far as the party who could take action suffered no loss, whilst the 
party who suffered the loss had no contractual claim. A similar 
situation existed in the case of WHITE v JONES (1995), (16) where 
the plaintiffs were beneficiaries of a will which the defendant solicitors 
had negligently failed to draw up In time, thereby depriving them of 
their inheritance. In all three cases, the privity rule prevented an 
action in contract, and the plaintiff turned to tort. This remedy was 
denied in the case of THE ALIAKMON, but not in the subsequent 
cases. It appears that the ability of the party to secure alternative 
protection was seen as a key factor here, and I would argue that the 
courts are adopting an efficiency orientated approach as regards the 
commercial party in THE ALIAKMON, but a socially orientated 
approach as regards the non commercial parties in the other cases. 
This means that the courts are taking Into consideration the 
bargaining power of the two parties, when deciding whether there 
should be legal liability In tort. 
2.2.9 There is now pressure to reform this whole area of law, and this 
is reflected in the final report of the Law Commission on the doctrine 
of privity, entitled 'Privity of Contract: Contracts for the benefit of third 
parties (17). The suggested reforms of the privity rule will seek to 
remove some of the present restrictions, and to allow a limited right 
of third parties to enforce contracts made for their benefit. It is 
proposed that third parties should have the right to enforce contracts 
in one of the two following situations; either where there is an express 
term to that effect, or where the contract purports to confer a benefit 
on third parties, and there is nothing to suggest that there was no 
such intention. The presumption of third party rights in the second 
situation is rebuttable by the contracting parties. In both cases, it is 
necessary that the third party is identified, either as a named 
individual, or as part of a class of potential beneficiaries. 
Page 71 
2.2.10 This reform is based on protecting the 'reasonable 
expectations' or 'legitimate expectations' of the contracting parties, as 
well as their intentions. However, to some extent, these two objectives 
are in conflict, and this is reflected in some of the problems of the 
proposed reforms, as identified by Adams, Beyleveld and Beatson in 
their recent article (18). They argue that the intentions of the 
contracting parties are given too great a priority over what they refer 
to as the 'legitimate expectations' of the third party. This can be seen 
in the fact that the contracting parties will be able to exclude the 
rights of the third party to enforce, even though the whole aim of the 
contract was to create a benefit for that party, which is of no value 
unless it is enforceable. In addition, the contracting parties will be 
able to rely on any clauses restricting or excluding liability, without 
being subject to the requirements of the UNFAIR CONTRACT 
TERMS ACT 1977, in respect of a contractual claim (19). Finally, it 
is noted that the proposals for reform will not apply to situations like 
WHITE V JONES where there is a disappointed beneficiary, as the 
Law Commission states that this is does not fall within the two 
situations outlined above. 
2.2.11 As we can see, the issue of privity has not been fully dealt 
with, and it seems that there will still be situations where the plaintiff 
will be forced to turn to the tortious remedy. The Law Commission 
has not based liability upon 'reasonable expectation' in all cases, but 
has allowed the traditional concept of contractual intention to defeat 
such ends. Yet we could argue that the contractual intentions of the 
contracting parties should really be based on reasonable expectation, 
and as such the dichotomy between the two approaches can be seen 
as illusory. Nevertheless, despite this continuing conflict, it is clear 
that the doctrine of privity has already been considerably eroded in 
English Law, and will be largely overridden if the above reforms are 
implemented. 
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2.3 Consideration 
2.3.1 A key defining element of contractual liability, as opposed to 
tortious liability, is that It is based upon the concept of a reciprocal 
agreement. This means that both parties must provide something in 
return for what the other party provides or promises to provide; an 
Idea represented by the doctrine of consideration. However, it is now 
clear that the doctrine of consideration is under attack as a result of 
recent judicial decisions. 
2.3.2 The leading case here is WILLIAMS v ROFFEY BROTHERS 
(1990) (20), where contractual liability was seen as based on 
concepts of fairness and commercial realities, rather than a rigid 
attachment to the doctrine of consideration. Although the court 
believed it was discovering consideration. In the readiness of the 
plaintiff to continue the contract, in reality it was creating a liability 
based on fairness, reasonableness and commercial utility (21). This 
approach can be seen as similar to the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel, as first developed in CENTRAL LONDON PROPERTY v 
HIGH TREES HOUSE (1947) (22). Even though in WILLIAMS v 
ROFFEY, the court said that it did not base its decision on the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel (23), In both cases liability seems to 
be based upon reliance on a promise rather than reciprocal 
exchange. As such, this bears close resemblance to the basis of 
tortious liability, especially liability for negligence. 
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2.3.3 The issue of consideration has recently been discussed in the 
case of Re SELECTMOVE (1995) (24). Here the courts refused to 
enforce an agreement between the appellant company and the Inland 
Revenue, on the grounds that a promise to pay an existing sum was 
not good consideration, thus affirming the principle in FOAKES v 
BEER (1884) (25). This decision may be seen as affirming the 
classical theory of consideration, but in effect, the decision was 
reached because the courts refused to allow the operation of the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel, on the grounds that the appellant 
company had behaved in an inequitable manner. In this case, they 
had failed to honour their promises to pay Inland Revenue the tax and 
national insurance payments as they fell due, as part of the new 
agreement. It is for this reason, that Gibson LJ was able to state at 
page 539; 
'...it was not inequitable or unfair for the Crown ...to demand 
payment of all the arrears' 
2.3.4 As such, the decision in Re SELECTMOVE, can be seen as 
similar to WILLIAMS v ROFFEY, with the deciding factor being the 
idea of fairness. In WILLIAMS v ROFFEY, the argument of lack of 
reciprocity was also negated by the fact that the courts believed that 
this would be unfair to the plaintiffs, as per Russell LJ; 
'... Can the defendants now escape liability on the ground that 
the plaintiff undertook to do no more than he had originally 
contracted to do....it would certainly be unconscionable if this 
were to be their legal entitlement' (26) 
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2.3.5 In effect, it can be argued, that liability in contract is now based 
more on the idea of reasonable reliance, rather than the traditional 
concept of reciprocity. This allows the courts to impose their own Idea 
of when liability is due, instead of looking to the formal actions of the 
contracting parties. Similariy, the development of the duty of good 
faith in pre contractual negotiations, as seen in PITT v PHH ASSETT 
MANAGEMENT LTD (1993) (27), can also be seen as based on 
reasonable reliance, rather than traditional contract law concepts of 
consideration. (28) 
2.3.6 In all these cases, I would argue that the courts are taking an 
efficiency orientated approach, and reflecting the attitudes of 
commercial reality in what are purely business contracts. This 
Involves a rejection of the more traditional concepts of contract law, 
in place of seeking to determine the real Intentions of the contracting 
parties; a point made by Russell LJ in WILLIAMS v ROFFEY 
BROTHERS (1990); 
'...Consideration there must still be but in my judgement the 
courts nowadays should be more ready to find Its existence so 
as to reflect the intention of the parties to the contract where the 
bargaining powers are not unequal and where the finding of 
consideration reflects the true intentions of the parties'. (29) 
It is clear here that the intention of the parties is to be determined by 
commercial realities, rather than a search for a specific consideration 
as defined by traditional contract law. 
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2.4 Strict Liability 
2.4.1 The final aspect of contract law liability, which I wish to consider 
here, is the idea that it is based on the free will of the contracting 
parties, and so requires strict liability in the terms of the contract. I 
would argue that this idea is incorrect on two counts; firstly because 
the courts decide whether a contract exists at all, and secondly 
because they often determine the terms upon which it is made. 
2.4.2 The courts will sometimes decide, not only whether there is an 
agreement in the first place, but also what terms it is on. In this 
respect, they will often be in conflict with the opinion of at least one 
of the parties. This can be seen in the approach taken by the courts, 
in the classic case of BUTLER V EX CELLO CORPORATION (1979) 
(30). Here the courts decided that there was an agreement, and that 
it was on the buyer's terms, even though these terms were clearly not 
agreed to by the seller. The courts here preferred objective certainty, 
instead of seeking to ensure that there was an actual meeting of 
minds. It is difficult to see how this decision can be based upon a 
consensus of will. 
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2.4.3. The courts determine the terms of the contract in various ways. 
Sometimes they will Imply terms Into contracts, as in the case of 
LIVERPOOL CITY COUNCIL v IRWIN (1976) (31), where the courts 
Intervened by implying in terms which Imposed extra liability on the 
Council. Alternatively, the courts have rewritten contracts, by striking 
down unreasonable clauses as being In restraint of trade, a tactic 
used in SCHROEDER v MACAULEY (1974) (32). The courts have 
often taken similar action, on the grounds of incapacity, mistake, 
duress or undue influence (33). Finally, they have refused to enforce 
onerous terms, on the grounds that they have not been brought to the 
attention of the other party, as in the case of INTERFOTO v 
STILETTO VISUAL PRODUCTS (1988) (34). 
2.4.4 It is argued that the court is intervening here, to ensure that the 
contract is cleariy understood, or simply implying in terms on the 
basis of necessity. However, I think It is quite clear that the underiying 
reason Is that the courts think the contract will otherwise be 
unreasonable. This was acknowledged In INTERFOTO by Bingham 
LJ where he states at page 353; 
'...The well-known cases on sufficiency of notice are In my view 
properiy to be read in this context. At one level they are 
concerned with a question of pure contractual analysis, whether 
one party has done enough to give the other notice of the 
Incorporation of a term in the contract. At another level they are 
concerned with a somewhat different question, whether it would 
In all the circumstances be fair (or reasonable) to hold a party 
bound by any conditions or by a particular condition of an 
unusual or stringent nature'. 
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2.4.5 The position has been further developed by the introduction of 
statutory implied terms relating to the provision of services, in the 
SUPPLY OF GOODS AND SERVICES ACT 1982. Such services are 
to be carried out in a with 'reasonable' care and skill (35), and this 
requirement cannot be excluded or limited by an express term to the 
contrary, as it is subject to the UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS ACT 
1977. 
2.4.6 What we can see here is that the concept of reasonableness 
underpins the nature of contractual liability, at least as regards 
contracts for services. This is very similar to the concept of 
'reasonable foreseeability', which underpins the duty of care in the tort 
of negligence. In reality, the concept of 'reasonableness' allows the 
courts to decide cases on policy grounds; and here I would argue that 
the courts will tend to base their decision on either an efficiency 
orientated approach, or a socially orientated approach. 
2.4.7 In deciding what is 'reasonable', the courts will take into 
consideration such factors as the knowledge of the parties, their 
bargaining power, and the ability of the parties to secure alternative 
contractual cover. In INTERFOTO, the key issue was the lack of 
knowledge of the party affected; whilst in SCHROEDER it was the 
lack of bargaining power of that party. In SCHROEDER, the courts 
tended towards a socially orientated approach, and it has been 
argued that this ignored the commercial realities of the situation (36). 
However, in the case of INTERFOTO, it could be argued that the 
result was one which corresponds to the reasonable expectations of 
business parties, and as such, this could be seen as an efficiency 
orientated approach. What is interesting is how this difference in 
approach is seen again in cases of negligence involving 'economic 
loss'. 
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3. The Scope of the Liability 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Here we need to consider the relationship between the extent 
of contract and tort. This is Important In contracts for services, 
because the provider of the service is usually under a duty of care to 
perform the service with reasonable care and skill. As such, the 
nature of the liability is the same as in the tort of negligence; and it 
will be of interest to see the extent to which a contract can vary this 
duty, so that it is different from the tortious duty. 
3.1.2 In this respect, I wish to focus on three key areas which 
determine the scope of the liability in contract and tort, namely; 
concurrent liability, exemption clauses and contributory negligence. 
3.2 Concurrent Liability 
3.2.1 As concurrent liability is now accepted In contract and tort, the 
key issue is whether contractual liability and tortious liability can limit 
each others extent. The traditional view is that contractual terms will 
take priority, as the contracting parties have the right to define the 
extent of their own liability (37). However, some academics think that 
the liability in tort should not be so restricted, but should be 
completely independent of the contractual duty (38). 
Page 79 
3.2.2 Indeed, it is now argued that the tortious duty of care may well 
exceed the contractual duty of care, where the contractual duty is 
framed in respect of more limited liability. This can be seen in the 
case of HOLT v PAYNE SKILLINGTON (1995) (39), where the Court 
of Appeal agreed that they could envisage a situation in which the 
duty of care in tort and contract was concurrent, but not coextensive. 
In the words of Hirst LJ at page 702; 
'...In their Lordships' opinion there was no reason in principle 
why a Hedley Byrne type of duty of care...could not arise in an 
overall set of circumstances where, by reference to certain 
limited aspects of those circumstances, the same parties 
entered into a contractual relationship involving more limited 
obligations than those imposed by the duty of care in tort'. 
3.2.3 It can be argued that the extent of the contractual duty does not 
in itself define the tortious liability, and that instead the two areas of 
liability are effectively independent of each other. 
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3.3 Exemption Clauses 
3.3.1 Exemption clauses can be used to define the limits of the legal 
liability, and so It would seem that the contracting parties could use 
such clauses to limit the extent of the tortious duty of care. However, 
the UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS ACT 1977 requires that such 
clauses must be 'reasonable', if they are to be used in a consumer 
contract or a standard form contract, otherwise the clause will be 
Invalid as per Section 3(2). In most cases, a commercial contract will 
be on a standard form, and so this means that almost all contracts 
will be covered by this requirement. The definition of 'reasonableness' 
Is further developed in Section 11 and Schedule 2 of the Act. Section 
11 refers to the ability of the parties to meet their liability, and their 
ability to arrange insurance cover; whilst the criteria in Schedule 2 
refer to the knowledge of the parties and their bargaining power. 
3.3.2 The approach of the courts can be seen In leading cases such 
as GEORGE MITCHELL v FINNEY LOCK SEEDS (1983) (40) and the 
more recent CITY OF ST ALBANS DC v INTERNATIONAL 
COMPUTERS (1994) (41). In both cases, the courts found that the 
exemption clauses were unreasonable, because the party relying on 
them was in a better position to prevent the damage occurring, and 
also in a better position to arrange adequate insurance to deal with 
it. Effectively the courts were taking into consideration the bargaining 
power of the contracting parties, as this determined the terms on 
which the contract was made, a point made by Lord Bridge in 
GEORGE MITCHELL v FINNEY LOCK SEEDS at page 744; 
'The question of relative bargaining strength...and of the 
opportunity to buy seeds without a limitation of the seedsman's 
liability...were interrelated'. 
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3.3.3 It is important to note that the same controls exist over 
disclaimers of liability for negligence, except that Schedule 2 does not 
apply. However, in the case of SMITH v BUSH (1990), Lord Griffiths 
laid down his own criteria in place of Schedule 2, and these have 
become the accepted tests of reasonableness for tortious liability. The 
most significant aspect of them is that they are very similar to those 
in Schedule 2, and in particular refer to the bargaining power of the 
parties. In effect, the key criteria in defining reasonableness are the 
same in contract as in tort. It seems that in both types of actions, 
they will take the same bifurcated approach. In cases involving 
weaker parties, the courts will tend to take a socially orientated 
approach; but where the parties are of equal bargaining power, the 
courts are more likely to take an efficiency orientated approach. We 
can see an example of the courts taking a socially orientated 
approach, in the case of SMITH v BUSH, where the court struck down 
the exemption clause because they felt it was unfair on the weaker 
party. 
3.3.4 Any attempt to define the scope of tortious liability in a 
contractual term, will be seen as a form of exemption clause. As such 
it will be subject to the regime of the UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS 
ACT 1977, as outlined above. As a result, any term limiting or 
excluding liability in the duty of care, whether contractual or tortious, 
must satisfy the requirement of 'reasonableness', in almost all cases. 
As this concept underlies the duty of care in the tort of negligence, 
then it would seem that contract terms cannot limit the tortious liability 
but at best will be coterminous with it. The idea that the contract can 
define the duty of care in advance, so that there are no exemption 
clauses to be subject to the UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS ACT 1977, 
is an act of sophistry ruled out of order in PHILLIPS v HYLAND 
(1987) (42), as reaffirmed in SMITH v BUSH (1989). 
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3.4 Contributory Negligence 
3.4.1 A further intrusion of tortious principles Into the domain of 
contract can be seen in the area of contributory negligence. This has 
long been accepted as a factor limiting the liability of the defendant 
In tort, with the LAW REFORM (CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE) 
ACT 1945, allowing courts to apportion damages between the 
defendant and the plaintiff. In contract, it is possible to achieve similar 
results under the doctrine of mitigation of losses, but this only comes 
Into effect after the breach, and does not cover any prior negligence 
by the plaintiff. 
3.4.2 However, it now appears that contributory negligence is 
accepted as a defence to contractual liability, where it is based upon 
a duty of care similar to that in tort. This is because the statute refers 
to 'fault' in Section 1, and this is later defined as Including negligence 
in Section 4. This position was affirmed in the case of 
FORSKRINGSAKTIESELSKAPET v BUTCHER (1988) (43) where it 
was held that the LAW REFORM (CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE) 
ACT 1945 would apply to such liability even though the claim was 
brought in contract, as the contractual duty was paralleled by that in 
tort. This view was recently confirmed in BARCLAYS BANK v 
FAIRCLOUGH BUILDING (1995) (44), where the court held that 
contributory negligence would apply to contractual duties analogous 
to the tortious duty of care, but not to strict contractual duties, such 
as executing the work in an 'expeditious, efficient and workmanlike 
manner'. 
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3.4.3 The role of contributory negligence in contract has now been 
considered by the Law Commission, in their consultation paper 
entitled 'Contributory Negligence as a defence in Contract'(45). This 
took the view that liability for strict contractual duties should not be 
affected, but that contributory negligence should apply where there 
was a duty of reasonable care. In this way, the Law Commission 
recognised that the contractual and tortious duty of care were 
effectively the same; 
'...there is a clear similarity in substance between an action for 
breach of a contractual duty of care and an action for breach of 
a tortious duty of reasonable care. Whether a duty of 
reasonable care is classified as tortious or contractual does not 
affect the content of that duty.' (46) 
3.4.4 I would argue that the provision of a service requires that there 
be an underlying duty of reasonable care, which means that liability 
is really fault based. Only where the service is defined specifically, 
can we really argue for a strict liability (47). Therefore, it is essential 
that contributory negligence should be available, to apportion losses 
in both contract and tort, as regards contracts for services. This 
effectively erodes another of the key divides between contract and 
tort. 
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4. The Extent of the Remedy 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 When discussing the extent of the remedy, we need to consider 
such factors as the measure of damages, the type of damages 
claimable, and the impact of limitation periods. In contract, the extent 
of contractual liability is defined by the parties themselves, and relates 
to the consequences of the breach of contract. As a result, the 
remedy by way of damages should cover expectation loss as well as 
reliance loss, but they will not include non-pecuniary losses. These 
losses should be capable of limitation or exclusion by express term 
of the contract, so long as this is reasonable under THE UNFAIR 
CONTRACT TERMS ACT 1977. Moreover, the loss should arise from 
the time of the breach of the contract, and so any limitation period will 
run from that date. 
4.1.2 In tort, the extent of the liability is defined by law, and will be 
related to the injury caused. As a result, the remedy claimable should 
compensate for the injury or loss and will not usually include 
expectation losses, but should include non pecuniary loss. Moreover, 
as the injury is the determining factor in tortious liability, then the 
limitation period will run from the time of the injury. We should note 
here, that in tort the term 'economic loss' is used to denote 
'expectation loss'. 
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4.2 The Measure of Damages 
4.2.1 A key problem here is that it is difficult to distinguish between 
the different types of loss. The traditional rule is that the damages 
available in tort cover direct physical loss and consequential 
economic loss, but do not cover pure economic loss as in SPARTAN 
STEEL & ALLOYS LTD v MARTIN & CO LTD (1973) (48); yet in 
reality, this is a difficult distinction to make (49). In recent cases, this 
distinction has been questioned, as per Saville LJ in MARC RICH & 
CO AG V BISHOP ROCK MARINE CO LTD (1994), where he states; 
'...In recent years there have been several cases which deal 
with situations where no physical damage has resulted from the 
carelessness in question but where the claimant has sustained 
financial loss or expense. To my mind the law draws no 
fundamental difference between such cases and those where 
there is damage to persons or property' (50) 
4.2.2 If we consider the area of tortious liability, we could argue that 
the plaintiff will be claiming pure economic loss when he claims loss 
of earnings, especially where the plaintiff is self-employed. It is 
essentially very difficult to draw a line between consequential 
economic loss and pure economic loss, and it is interesting that the 
whole topic was ignored in SMITH v BUSH (1989). The position is 
complicated by the fact that it has long been possible to claim 
economic loss for a negligent misstatement, following HEDLEY 
BYRNE V HELLER (51). It is very difficult to draw a distinction 
between a negligent misstatement, and negligent action, especially 
when the statement is effectively based on a series of preceding 
actions, such as in HENDERSON v MERRETT (1994) or SMITH v 
BUSH (1990). Indeed, the illogicality of this distinction has already 
been recognised by academics such as Markesinis and Deakin (52). 
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4.2.3 In reality, the courts have tended to allow economic loss in tort, 
where they believe that it is reasonable to do so. In coming to these 
decisions, they are motivated by a number of factors. These may 
reflect an efficiency orientated approach, or a more socially orientated 
approach, depending upon the circumstances. 
4.2.4 The recent case of WHITE v JONES (1995), can be seen as 
being based on two key issues. The first one was the inability of the 
plaintiff to obtain legal redress in contract, because of the restrictions 
of the privity rule. According to Lord Browne-Wilkinson; 
'...To my mind it would be unacceptable if, because of some 
technical rules of law, the wishes and expectations of 
beneficiaries generally could be defeated by the negligent action 
of solicitors without there being any redress' (53) 
4.2.5 The second issue was the belief that there was a need for a 
negligent solicitor to be liable for his failings. This is referred to by 
Lord Goff where he states; 
'...I respectfully agree with Nicholls VC when he said that the 
court will have to fashion "an effective remedy for the solicitor's 
breach of his professional duty to his client" in such a way as 
to repair the injustice to the disappointed beneficiary'. (54) 
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4.2.6 These two reasons are based on various underlying 
approaches, but both of them seek to uphold the reasonable 
expectations of the parties involved. The requirement that the solicitor 
should be liable reflects the view that providers of a service should be 
responsible for their actions, and this fits into the efficiency orientated 
approach, as the failure to penalise poor performance would 
undermine the effectiveness of the whole profession. The need to 
provide a remedy for the plaintiff is arguably based on the socially 
orientated approach, as such parties will often be of limited means, 
and cannot be expected to make alternative contractual provisions. 
4.2.7 We can see the socially orientated approach, taking the key role 
in the case of SMITH v BUSH (1989) (55). Here the courts were 
influenced by the fact that the plaintiff was of limited means, and not 
in a very good bargaining position, compared to the defendants, the 
latter of whom were in a much better position to take out insurance 
cover. This is referred to by Lord Templeman at page 528 where he 
states; 
'...The public are exhorted to purchase their homes and cannot 
find houses to rent. A typical London suburban house, 
constructed in the 1930's for less than £1000 is now bought for 
more than £150,000 with money largely borrowed at high rates 
of interest and repayable over a period of a quarter of a century. 
In these circumstances it is not fair and reasonable for building 
societies and valuers to agree together to impose on purchasers 
the risk of loss arising as a result of incompetence or 
carelessness on the part of the valuers'. 
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4.2.8 Later in the same case, Lord Griffiths makes it clear that he 
would not take the same approach if the plaintiff was in a different 
bargaining position, so that imposing a duty of care might be 
inappropriate for... 
'different types of property...such as industrial property, large 
blocks of flats or very expensive houses'. (56) 
I would argue that the courts are taking the socially orientated 
approach here, and relating the legal liability to the bargaining 
position of the plaintiff. 
4.2.9 If we consider those case where the plaintiff is in a stronger 
bargaining position, the courts have tended to deny liability. In 
CAPARO V DICKMAN (1990) (57), the House of Lords based its 
decision on the argument, that the statutory purpose of the audit 
meant that the auditor was liable to the shareholders as shareholders, 
and not as potential investors. This line of reasoning is hard to follow, 
and has been subject to criticism elsewhere (58), as it is difficult to 
distinguish between the two roles of a shareholder. 
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4.2.10 In CAPARO, the court did not explicitly state that their decision 
was based upon the bargaining power of the two parties. However, 
this reasoning is alluded to in various remarks, the most notable of 
which, is that of Lord Oliver at page 593, where he states; 
'...It is not, however, suggested that the auditors, in certifying 
the accounts, or Parliament, in providing for such certification, 
did so for the purpose of assisting those who might be minded 
to profit from dealings in the company's shares'. 
This view, suggests that the court should not be too ready to 
intervene on behalf of economically powerful parties, such as 
investment companies, as the statutory protection was not designed 
to protect them in the case of speculative ventures. Instead, such 
companies should be prepared to secure their own protection by 
contractual means, such as arranging adequate insurance cover. 
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4.2.11 This approach was taken by Hoffmann J when hearing the 
case of MORGAN CRUCIBLE CO LTD v HILL SAMUEL BANK Ltd at 
first instance. He made the point that the court should take into 
consideration the relative economic power of the parties involved. He 
compared the decisions arrived at in SMITH v BUSH and CAPARO 
V DICKMAN where he stated; 
'...the typical plaintiff in a SMITH v BUSH type case is a person 
of modest means and making the most expensive purchase of 
his or her life. He is very unlikely to be insured against inherent 
defects. The surveyor can protect himself relatively easily by 
insurance. The take-over bidder, on the other hand, is an 
entrepreneur taking high risks for high rewards and while some 
accountants may be able to take out sufficient insurance, others 
may not. Furthermore, the take-over bidder is a limited liability 
company and the accountants are individuals for whom, save so 
far as they are covered by insurance, liability would mean 
personal ruin' (59) 
It is clear here that Hoffmann J sees the bargaining power of the two 
parties as a key aspect and he believes that the courts should not 
ignore the 'economic realities' of the situation. For this reason he 
feels that he courts should take a different line depending upon the 
nature of the parties involved. 
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4.2.12 It should be pointed out that this view was not shared by the 
Court of Appeal when they considered MORGAN CRUCIBLE v HILL 
SAMUEL (1991) (60). In particular Slade LJ argued that the court 
should not make a decision by reference to 'economic considerations' 
(61) , and then went on to allow the plaintiff to pursue his case despite 
the fact that he was of a similar bargaining power to the plaintiff in 
CAPARO. Similarly, the decision in MURPHY v BRENTWOOD (1990) 
(62) , still stands out as a clear example of the weaker party being 
denied a remedy, whilst the party who was best able to secure 
insurance cover, was exonerated from liability. However, I would 
argue that this decision is now in need of re-evaluation, in the light of 
the decisions in SMITH v BUSH. Also, we should note the recent 
cases, involving claims by Lloyd's names against their investment 
advisers, such as HENDERSON v MERRETT (1994) (63). Here the 
court was influenced by the fact that the plaintiffs were usually 
persons of modest means, whilst the defendants were in a better 
position to provide insurance cover. 
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4.2.13 A further area of confusion as regards tortious damages, can 
be seen in the cases involving claims for economic loss, arising from 
a fall in the market. This is effectively pure economic loss, and has 
been claimed in cases of negligent misstatement by valuers. In 
BANQUE BRUXELLES v EAGLE STAR (1995) (64), the court decided 
that the valuer would be liable for all the consequential damages, 
including the fall in the market price; it was clear that the plaintiff 
would not have entered the contract had the advice been correct. On 
appeal, the House of Lords reversed the decision in the renamed 
case of SOUTH AUSTRALIA ASSETS v YORK MONTAGUE (1996) 
(65), and found the valuers liable only for the difference between what 
they did lend and what they would have lent, and not the losses due 
to the fall in the market. As such, the scope of the liability has been 
narrowed, but it still appears analogous to contract, in so far as it still 
relates to the loss made by entering into the contract (66). 
4.2.14 The key factor underlying these decisions is the concept of 
reasonable reliance. It is not therefore surprising to find that the 
courts will take a different view of the extent of that reliance, 
according to the economic bargaining power of the plaintiff. A party 
of limited means will often be totally dependent on the advice given, 
or service rendered, by the other party, and quite unable to provide 
alternative means of protection. This was recognised by Lord Oliver 
in CAPARO where he referred to the reason for the decision in 
SMITH V BUSH. According to Lord Oliver; 
'...the adviser knows or ought to know that (the advice) will be 
relied on by a particular person or class of persons in 
connection with that transaction'. (67) 
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4.2.15 The extent to which a person is dependent on advice given, 
relates to their ability to obtain alternative sources of advice, and to 
secure alternative protection, usually by means of insurance. In cases 
like SMITH v BUSH, the dependence is greater, because neither of 
these approaches are really possible. This is acknowledged by Lord 
Griffiths in SMITH v BUSH, where talking about proximity, when he 
states; 
'...The necessary proximity arises from the surveyor's 
knowledge that the overwhelming probability is that the 
purchaser will rely on his valuation, the evidence was that 
surveyors knew that approximately 90% of purchasers did so...'. 
(68) 
In contrast, this position of total reliance is absent from the 
CAPARO case, where the court acknowledged that the defendants 
would not expect the plaintiffs to rely on their information alone. This 
is implied in the words of Lord Oliver as mentioned above. In 
CAPARO, the plaintiff was a corporate investor, and could not expect 
the courts to compensate him when his investment went sour. In the 
same way, in the BANQUE BRUXELLES case, the courts would not 
allow the plaintiff to recover damages to cover the fall in the market, 
as this was the kind of risk an investor would expect to take, and 
should have provided cover by way of insurance. However, where the 
investor was an individual of limited means, the courts have been 
willing to take a different view, as they did with the cases involving 
Lloyds investors (69), or arguably in SMITH v BUSH. 
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4.2.16 The issue of reliance leads to the courts taking a dual 
approach, dependent on the bargaining position of the plaintiff. Where 
the plaintiff has sufficient knowledge, and the ability to secure 
alternative protection, the courts tend to take an efficiency orientated 
approach, and allow the burden to fall on that party. This is the 
position taken in shipping cases such as THE ALIAKMON (70) and 
MARC RICH V BISHOP ROCK MARINE (71), as well as the corporate 
investor cases outlined above. However, where the plaintiff is in a 
weaker position, the courts tend to find liability for the plaintiff. This 
can be seen in the house purchasing case of SMITH v BUSH, as well 
as the individual investor cases such as HENDERSON v MERRETT. 
In effect, the extent of the damages has more to do with the type of 
plaintiff, rather than the type of action. This is a view supported by 
academics, such as Markesinis and Deakin, as well as more recently 
Dugdale and Stapleton (72) 
4.3 Non-Pecuniary Loss 
4.3.1 A further issue regarding the extent of the contractual remedy, 
is the question of non-pecuniary loss, such as damages for 
inconvenience and mental stress. The traditional view is that such 
losses are not available in contract, as established in the case of 
ADDIS V GRAMOPHONE CO LTD (1909) (73). However, we can see 
evidence of a relaxation of this position, in the so-called 'holiday', 
cases, such as JARVIS v SWAN TOURS (1973) (74) and JACKSON 
V HORIZON HOLIDAYS (1975) (75), whilst damages were allowed for 
mental distress in the purely commercial case of PERRY v SIDNEY 
PHILLIPS & SON (1982) (76). 
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4.3.2 This trend was sharply criticised in WOODAR v WIMPEY LTD 
(1980) (77), and BLISS v SOUTH EAST THAMES RHA (1985) (78). 
In the latter case, Dillon LJ, said that such damages should only be 
awarded in contracts where the main purpose was to provide peace 
of mind. In HAYES v JAMES & CHARLES DODD (A FIRM) (1990) 
(79) Staughton J reiterated that view, when he stated; 
'...it should not, in my judgement, include any case where the 
object of the contract was not comfort and pleasure, or the relief 
of discomfort, but simply carrying on a commercial activity with 
a view to profit'. (80) 
4.3.3 One interpretation of the Staughton view is that we need to 
distinguish between commercial and non commercial contracts, and 
this can be a difficult task (81). However, we could argue that we 
should take a different approach, depending on the purpose for which 
the party entered into the contract. Thus in a contract providing 
services for a non commercial party, the party obtaining those 
services could claim, but not the party providing them. This would 
seem to reflect the underlying views of Staughton J, and would mean 
that a bifurcated approach would be taken here; with the courts 
adopting a socially orientated approach in the first case, and an 
efficiency orientated approach in the second case. 
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4.4 Remoteness 
4.4.1 The difference between the remoteness rule in contract and tort, 
has long been a source of confusion. Lords Scarman and Orr were 
unsure of the difference, in the case of PARSONS v UTTLEY 
INGHAM & CO LTD (1978) (82). In the same case. Denning LJ, held 
that a different rule should operate in contract, depending upon 
whether the damage was physical or economic, with the tortious 
remoteness rule applying in the former case. 
4.4.2 In recent cases, the courts have tried to emphasise the 
difference between the contractual and tortious rule, as for example 
in the remarks of Stuart Smith LJ, in BROWN v KMR SERVICES LTD 
(1995) (83). However, it appears from other cases that the courts find 
real difficulty in establishing a difference. This was made clear by 
Lord Bingham MR, in BANQUE BRUXELLES LAMBERT v EAGLE 
STAR INSURANCE CO LTD, where he stated; 
'...Somewhat different language has been used to define the 
test (of remoteness of damages) in contract and tort but the 
essence of the test is the same in each case'. (84) 
4.4.3 It would appear that there is still uncertainty here, but the 
difficulty in distinguishing between the contractual and the tortious rule 
on remoteness is evidence that the rules are gradually being 
assimilated. 
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4.5 Limitation Periods 
4.5.1 It is in the area of limitation periods, where we can see the most 
enduring distinction between contract and tort. In contract, the 
limitation period runs for six years commencing from the date of the 
breach of contract (85). The period for tort is also six years, but it 
commences from the date at which the damage occurs, or three 
years from when the plaintiff knew or should have known sufficient 
facts to commence proceedings (86). 
4.5.2 In the case of a latent defect, in a person or a building, the 
contractual limitation period may well have expired. However, if the 
claim can be brought in tort, then the period will only commence when 
the plaintiff is aware of the damage, and so it is unlikely that the claim 
will be time barred. It is this factor, which has been the reason for 
many claims brought in tort, where a contract exists, such as in 
LANCASHIRE AND CHESHIRE v HOWARD & SEDDON and 
HENDERSON v MERRETT (1994) (87). Indeed, it is this distinction 
between contract and tort, which is the reason for cases being 
brought in the tort of negligence to recover loss of profits. As such, 
the existence of the different limitation rules, has a destabilising effect 
on the relationship between contract and tort, as it leads to attempts 
to obtain contract type remedies, by way of tortious actions. 
Page 98 
5. Concfusion 
5.1 We can see that the developments in the law have tended to 
erode the traditional distinction between contract and the tort of 
negligence, as regards the nature and scope of the liability, and the 
extent of the remedy. It is important to note how the interrelationship 
between these areas has affected the contract/tort divide. For 
example, the existence of a relatively strict privity rule in English Law, 
has led to pressure on the courts to allow economic loss in tort, for 
both negligent statements and negligent actions (88). In effect, where 
the divide is strong in one area, it leads to a breach being made in 
the other. 
5.2 Overall, it can be seen that we now have considerable overlap 
between the two areas, based on several factors. As regards the 
nature of the liability, we can see how the privity rule has been 
undermined by the concept of 'vicarious immunity', whilst 
consideration is being replaced by the tortious based idea of 
reasonable reliance. The nature of liability is seen as being based on 
objective criteria of 'reasonableness', rather than strictly related to the 
terms agreed between two parties; in effect, a liability similar to that 
in tort. It is for this reason that contributory negligence is now 
beginning to limit contractual liability. Finally, the confusion over 
defining the measure of loss has led to the erosion of the difference 
between contractual and tortious remedies. 
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5.3 I would argue that the courts are now more concerned with the 
nature of the relationship between the two parties, and their relative 
bargaining power, rather than the nature of the action commenced. 
Where the parties are of similar bargaining power, the tendency is to 
see the relationship as 'commercial', and to take an efficiency 
orientated approach, putting the liability onto the party who is in the 
best position to arrange alternative remedies. Where the parties are 
more unequal, the tendency is to take a socially orientated approach, 
and put the burden on the stronger party. 
5.4 In the next chapter, I would like to analyse the approach of the 
courts to contracts of service, where the two parties are usually in an 
unequal relationship. In this respect, I wish to compare their approach 
with the approach taken with contracts for services. 
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Chapter 5 
THE APPROACH OF THE COURTS IN THE UK 
(2) CONTRACTS OF SERVICE 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Key factors of the relationship 
1.1.1 When we deal with contracts of service, we are dealing with a 
significantly different situation from contracts for services, in a number 
of respects. Firstly, there is no problem in identifying the contract 
between the two parties and so the issues of privity and consideration 
are not usually a problem. Moreover we can see that there is a clear 
overlap between contractual and tortious liability in a number of key 
areas, such as the duty of care and the duty of confidentiality. Finally, 
we have a relationship in which one party is usually in a stronger 
economic bargaining position than the other, usually the employer. As 
a result, it is not surprising to find that the courts have tended to take 
the side of the employee in cases where they feel the employer is 
abusing his position of power. 
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1.2 Interrelationship of contractual and tortious duties 
1.2.1 The interrelationship between contractual and tortious duties in 
the employment contract is the result of historical developments. As 
we have seen, in the early evolution of contract there was a confusion 
between tortious and contractual liability, especially in contracts for 
personal service. By the 18th century contract had become the main 
type of legal liability for employment relationships (1), but the 
development of the defence of common employment made it very 
difficult for an employee to take legal action for injury sustained at 
work. As a result, the courts developed the parallel tortious liability in 
negligence under the personal duty of care of the employer for the 
employee. The main aspects of this duty were outlined in the leading 
case of WILSON & CLYDE COAL v ENGLISH (2). This tortious 
liability was developed by the virtual disappearance of volenti in 
SMITH V BAKER (3) and the avoidance of the issue of contributory 
negligence. 
1.3 Economic bargaining power of the parties 
1.3.1 Another key aspect is the imbalance of economic bargaining 
power between the two contracting parties. Not only is the power 
usually in the hands of the employer, it is the employer who will 
invariably draw up the terms of the contract of employment, which will 
usually be standard terms applying to all employees of a certain 
grade. It is because of this that courts may be prepared to take a 
more socially orientated approach and to treat employees in the same 
way as consumers, in effect a protected category of contracting party. 
This can be seen in their willingness to disallow contractual terms 
which are seen as unfair on the weaker party. 
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1.4 Analytical framework 
1.4.1 Again I wish to consider the contract for services with respect 
to three main areas; the nature of the liability, the scope of the liability 
and the type of remedy offered. In this way we can identify the 
similarities and differences between the contractual and tortious 
liability. 
2. The Nature of the Liability 
2.1 The Basis of Liability 
2.1.1 The contract of service is based upon a reciprocal agreement 
but the terms included are often derived from the tort of negligence. 
This involves the duty of care to the employee, which is wider than 
merely a duty towards his safety, but has been widened in recent 
years to include an employee's economic well-being and a 
requirement to treat the employee reasonably as can be seen in 
cases such as UNITED BANK vAKHTAR (1989) (4). This is balanced 
by corresponding duties on the employee of confidentiality and the 
duty to perform his job in a reasonable manner. 
2.2 Type of liability 
2.2.1 The issues of privity and consideration are not a problem here, 
so that the key issue we need to consider is whether the type of 
liability is strict or fault based. If it is fault based, then we are 
essentially founding liability on the concept of 'reasonableness', which 
is the basis of the tort of negligence, rather than the strict liability in 
traditional contract law. 
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2.2.2 The problem with contracts of service is that they are seen as 
limited by the personal attributes of the parties, and not the strict 
requirements that may be expected in the exchange of inanimate 
objects. The essence of this problem can be seen in the judicial 
debate in the seminal case of JOHNSTONE v BLOOMSBURY HA (5). 
Here the Health Authority had a contract which allowed it to call on 
the plaintiff to work up to 88 hours a week on average if required. Of 
the three Court of Appeal judges who heard the case, one of them 
(Leggatt LJ) took the view that the term should be interpreted strictly, 
however unfair the result; 
'...It may indeed be scandalous that junior doctors should not be 
offered more civilised terms of service in our hospitals...(but) 
(t)hey do not constitute means by which those bound by current 
contracts can be enabled by the ingenuity of their lawyers to 
derogate from obligations freely assumed'. (6) 
2.2.3 Legatt based his opinion to a large extent on an efficiency 
oriented approach. He believed it was necessary to uphold the 
express terms of the contract, because otherwise the employer would 
have to tailor his work requirements to the health of the individual 
doctor (7). This would mean that the employer would not know how 
many hours he could require his employees to work, and this would 
inject a considerable level of uncertainty into the arrangement, which 
would be detrimental to the efficient operation of the business. 
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2.2.4 On the other hand, the other two judges (Browne-Wilkinson V-C 
and Stuart-Smith LJ) took the view that such terms had to be based 
on reasonableness. Browne-Wilkinson felt that the contractual right to 
call for overtime was subject to the requirement that the right was 
exercised reasonably, so as not to breach the duty of care; 
'...In my judgement, the authority's right to call for overtime...is 
not an absolute right but must be limited in some way. There is 
no technical legal reason why the authority's discretion to call 
for overtime should not be exercised in conformity with the 
normal implied duty to take reasonable care not to injure their 
employee's health. (8)' 
This view was broadly supported by Stuart-Smith LJ in his judgement. 
Page 109 
2.2.5 This alternative position is based on a socially oriented 
approach, which involves much greater concern for the well being of 
the individual employee, rather than the efficient operation of the 
business. The employee is seen as the weaker party because the 
employer has a monopoly power, and as such the employee is in 
need of the court's protection. This is clear from the comments of 
Stuart-Smith LJ in JOHNSTONE where he states; 
'...Any doctor who wishes to practice has to serve at least one 
year as a house officer in a hospital; the national health service 
(NHS) is effectively a monopoly employer. Is the aspiring doctor 
who has spent many years in training to this point to abandon 
his chosen profession because the employer may exercise its 
power to call upon him to work so many hours that his health is 
undermined? I fail to see why he should not approach the 
matter on the basis that the employer will only exercise that 
power consistently with its duty to have proper regard to his 
health and safety'. (9) 
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2.2.6 This conflict between strict and fault based liability essentially 
revolves around the way in which the duty of care is implied into the 
contract of service. In the case of contracts of employment, implied 
terms are seen as a 'necessary incident of a definable category of 
contractual relationship' as in SCALLY v SOUTHERN HEALTH 
AUTHORITY (1991) (10). This would suggest that the duty of care is 
implied into a contract because it is necessary for it to work properly, 
and not because it is reasonable. Yet the duty of care itself is based 
upon 'reasonableness' as made clear in WILSON & CLYDE COAL v 
ENGLISH (1937), so it is difficult to see how it can only be implied on 
the grounds of necessity. In reality it is implied on the grounds of 
'reasonableness'. This can be seen in the remarks of Lord Bridge in 
SCALLY where he sees necessity and reasonableness as interlinked; 
'...I fully appreciate that the criterion to justify an implication of 
this kind is necessity, not reasonableness. But I take the view 
that it is not merely reasonable, but necessary, in the 
circumstances postulated, to imply an obligation on the 
employer to take reasonable steps to bring the term of the 
contract in question to the employee's attention, so that he may 
be in a position to enjoy its benefit'. (11) 
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2.2.7 We can see this confusion arising in the case of UNITED BANK 
v AKHTAR which was held before the Employment Appeal Tribunal. 
The tribunal held that the employee could not be expected to move 
to a new post at a completely different location, and the decision was 
seen as based upon necessity; 
'...the basis upon which we find the implied terms as to notice 
and as to the provision of relocation or other allowances...is that 
they are not just reasonable but necessary in order for the rest 
of the contract to operate according to its terms'. (12) 
Yet it can be argued that the deciding factor here was really 
'reasonableness', as the employee could have relocated when 
required, although this would have caused considerable problems 
both for himself and his wife. This was not a case of physical or even 
practical impossibility, it was that the tribunal felt it was unreasonable 
for the employee to be asked to move at such short notice. Indeed, 
the tribunal admitted that there was little difference between the need 
to give reasonable notice, and a duty on both sides to co-operate so 
as not to frustrate performance of the contract. As such, necessity 
can be seen as based upon reasonableness. 
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2.2.8 In the later case of WHITE v REFLECTING ROADSTUDS. also 
held before the Employment Appeal Tribunal (13), it was stated that 
the liability was based upon necessity, rather than reasonableness, 
and that the AKHTAR decision should be read in that light. Yet the 
tribunal acknowledged that a purely 'capricious' decision would not be 
allowed, and that a decision to move someone would have to be 
made on 'reasonable or sufficient grounds' (14). In the WHITE case 
the employer was able to transfer the employee to a new department, 
because it was in the interests of the firm, as the employee could not 
perform his original job efficiently. This right to transfer might be seen 
as based upon necessity, but it was also reasonable in the 
circumstances. After all, in the law of unfair dismissal, a dismissal on 
the grounds of incapacity is automatically reasonable. (15) 
2.3 Conclusion 
2.3.1 We can see that the nature of liability in the contract of 
employment is different from ordinary contractual liability, because of 
the personal nature of the relationship. Moreover, we can see that the 
underlying nature of the liability in contract is based on the concept 
of reasonableness rather that strict liability. This means that a term 
implied into the contract will be implied on the grounds of 
reasonableness and that the key requirement is that the contract will 
be fair overall, even if not always fair in the particular circumstance 
(16). As such, it means that there is little difference between the 
contractual and tortious liability with regard to the nature of liability. 
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3. The Scope of the Liability 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 There is a clear interrelationship here between the nature of the 
liability and its scope. In particular, the issue of whether liability is 
strict or fault based, is reflected in the issue of whether contractual 
terms override tortious liability. If contractual liability is fault based, as 
in tort, then there is no real clash. However, if it is believed that 
liability is strict in contract, and any term is implied in only on the 
grounds of necessity, then it will be in conflict with a fault based 
tortious liability, and the extent to which contractual or tortious liability 
predominates will be seen as crucial. 
3.1.2 It is therefore important to determine the extent of contractual 
and tortious liability, and to see how this relates to the issue of 
exclusion and limitation clauses. Moreover, we need to consider the 
effect of the tortious principle of contributory negligence on 
contractual liability. In doing this, it is useful to consider the underlying 
ideological approaches which we identified in Chapter 3. 
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3.2 The extent of contract and tort liability 
3.2.1 The traditional view is that contractual terms will define the 
liabilities of the parties, and will override any tortious based liabilities 
imposed by law. This view was expressed in the much quoted case 
of TAI HING COTTON MILL LTD v LUI CHONG HING BANK LTD 
(1985) (17). It was followed in a number of other cases, and is 
reflected in the views of Leggatt LJ in JOHNSTONE where he states; 
'...the parties' mutual obligations in tort cannot be any greater 
than those to be found expressly or by necessary implication in 
their contract'. (18) 
3.2.2 This view was also followed by Browne-Wilkinson in the same 
case, where he referred to the TAI HING case in the same way as 
Leggatt. The underlying reasoning here is that the contract is freely 
negotiated between the two parties, and to allow this express 
contractual duty to be overridden by tortious liability based upon 
different principles, would be to deny the right of freedom of contract. 
This is a point made forcibly by Leggatt LJ in the JOHNSTONE case 
where he states that although the conditions of the contract may be 
'scandalous' and possibly in need of amelioration by the legislature, 
it is not possible for the courts to avoid them (19). 
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3.2.3 The same reasoning is used to defeat tlie idea that an express 
term can be limited by an implied term effectively imposed by the 
courts. Leggat LJ at the beginning of his judgement in JOHNSTONE 
states; 
'...it is axiomatic that the scope of an express term cannot be 
cut down by an implied term; and that is as true of terms 
implied by law as it is of terms which depend on the intentions 
of the parties'. (20) 
3.2.4 A quite different approach is taken by Stuart-Smith in the same 
case. He takes the view that the duty of care, which is implied into the 
contract by law, will override any contrary express term of the 
contract. The implied duty of care is analogous, and indeed often 
identical to, the tortious duty of care. He sees this duty imposed by 
law as taking priority over the terms agreed between the parties. In 
this respect, I would argue that he is taking the more socially 
orientated approach, which is more in tune with the tortious nature of 
liability. 
Page 116 
3.2.5 The conflict which arose in JOHNSTONE has been played out 
in various other cases. In REID v RUSH TOMPKIN (1989) (21), the 
court refused to allow any duty of care in respect of the economic 
well-being of the plaintiff, to be implied into the contract. The court felt 
that the express terms overrode any tortious liability, and it was not 
possible to imply in any similar duty of care. In the words of Ralph 
Gibson LJ; 
'...on the facts alleged, it is not open to this court to extend the 
duty of care owed by these defendants to the plaintiff by 
imposing a duty in tort which, if I am right, is not contained in 
any express or implied term of the contract'. (22) 
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3.2.6 It can be argued that this interpretation was based upon an 
efficiency orientated approach to the problem, whereby the crucial 
issue was that the contracting parties should be fully aware of their 
potential liability under the contract, so that they could arrange 
appropriate insurance. To impose a wider liability would place 
considerable requirements upon business, a point emphasised by 
Ralph Gibson LJ where he states; 
'...It seems to me that it would require of the employers, many 
of whom may have no such resources of advice or experience 
as may be available to these defendants, and who may employ 
only one or two servants, to discover much information about 
foreign legal and social systems in order to decide whether such 
a term (imposing liability) requires action on their part'. (23) 
Here the court does not wish to impose too great a burden upon 
small businesses, and instead would rather the risk in this case fell 
upon the employee. Even if this present employer did have the 
necessary resources to obtain the relevant advice, not all businesses 
would be able to. Therefore, it was seen as preferable not to impose 
such a requirement on business as a whole. 
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3.2.7 The subsequent case of SCALLY v SOUTHERN HEALTH AND 
SOCIAL SERVICES BOARD (1991), was decided on the basis that 
there was a duty of care to the employer, to bring important 
information on pension entitlement to the attention of the employees. 
It was made clear by Lord Bridge that this duty was not derived from 
tort when he stated; 
'...If a duty of the kind in question was not inherent in the 
contractual relationship, I do not see how it could possibly be 
derived from the tort of negligence'. (24) 
Yet the implied term is effectively based upon the same concepts of 
reasonableness as the duty of care in tort. 
3.2.8 Moreover, if we consider the more recent case of SPRING v 
GUARDIAN ASSURANCE PLC (1994) (25) we can see how the court 
now sees the duty of care in respect of economic well-being as 
deriving independently of contract. There is no longer any suggestion 
that the duty of care in tort is subordinate to any contractual duty, as 
made clear by Lord Goff; 
'...Where the relationship between the parties is that of 
employer and employee, the duty of care could be expressed as 
arising from an implied term of the contract of employment....But 
in the present case this adds nothing to the duty of care which 
arises under the HEDLEY BYRNE principle, and so may be 
applicable as a tortious duty, either where there is no contract 
between the parties, or concurrently with a contractual duty to 
the same effect'. (26) 
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3.2.9 It can be seen that the tortious duty of care now appears to be 
acting quite independently of the contractual duty, and cannot be 
overridden by it. Even where he court does consider that the express 
terms of as contract should apply, it seems that such terms must be 
interpreted in a 'reasonable' manner, as per the views of Browne-
Wilkinson in JOHNSTONE. 
3.3 Exemption clauses 
3.3.1 The extent to which an exclusion or limitation clause will be 
legally valid is a key issue, because if such clauses are not controlled 
in any way, then they can impose a strict liability which may be 
unreasonable. Here we need to consider the impact of the UNFAIR 
CONTRACT TERMS ACT 1977, which controls such clauses, and will 
apply to contracts of employment. We should note that the UNFAIR 
TERMS IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS REGULATIONS 1994 will not 
apply, because contracts of employment are definitively excluded from 
the scope of the regulations in Schedule 1. 
3.3.2 The UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS ACT 1977 has been held to 
apply to contracts of employment both in respect of the liability in 
negligence under Section 2, and the liability in contract under Section 
3. Under Section 2, it is impossible to exclude or limit liability for 
death or personal injury, and liability for other loss can only be so 
restricted if reasonable. According to Schedule 1 paragraph 4 of the 
Act, Section 2 will not apply to contracts of employment except where 
it is in favour of the employee. There is no reference to section 3, but 
the natural conclusion is that section 3 applies to both parties. 
Although an employee is not a consumer, as defined in Section 12 of 
the Act, he will usually contract on the other parties standard terms, 
and so Section 3 will apply. It was the opinion of Stuart-Smith LJ in 
JOHNSTONE that contracts of employment were covered (27). 
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3.3.3 As the UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS ACT will apply, it is clear 
that any contract term which can be construed as an exclusion or 
limitation clause, will be subject to the requirement of reasonableness. 
Criteria for determining what is reasonable are laid down in Schedule 
2 of the Act. Although it states that these only refer to breaches of 
Sections 6, 7, 20 and 21 , it is now clear that these criteria will be 
applied to any breach of the Act. Similar guidelines can also be found 
in cases such as SMITH v BUSH (1990) (28). In both statute and 
case law, it is clear that the bargaining position of the parties is a key 
factor in determining liability, essentially a socially orientated 
approach. The fact that the bargaining position is so important, 
reflects the view that Section 2 only applies where it works to protect 
the employee not the employer. 
3.3.4 The key factor here is that any express term of the contract 
which seeks to exclude or limit liability, will be subject to the 
requirements of the test of reasonableness. This test is essentially the 
same as the underlying basis of tortious liability, so that with regard 
to exclusion and limitation clauses, there is little to chose between the 
two areas of law. 
3.4 Contributory Negligence 
3.4.1 In contract law, we can see no evidence of contributory 
negligence in employment cases. However, as the remedy is usually 
in the form of damages, it is arguable that this is reflected in the size 
of the award. The Law Commission report on contributory negligence 
as a defence in contract, issued in 1993, may well lead to a more 
flexible approach, which could affect contracts of employment (29). 
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3.4.2 In respect of actions in tort, there is of course no problem with 
contributory negligence, as this will reduce the amount of damages 
claimable, whether for physical injury or loss of opportunity. 
3.5 Conclusion 
3.5.1 The extent of the liability in contract and tort must be considered 
in the light of the nature of the liability. The underpinning liability 
seems to based on reasonableness, and this relates to the tortious 
principle. It would appear that the tortious duty of care is now clearly 
accepted as equal to, if not superior to, the contractual duty of care. 
3.5.2 The effect of statute on the use of exemption clauses, means 
that liability here cannot be strict, at least against the interests of the 
employee. We are therefore in a situation not unlike the tortious duty 
of care, where any strict liability is imposed by statute for the benefit 
of employees (30). 
4. The Extent of the Remedy 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 When we consider the extent of the remedy, we need to look at 
the measure of damages, the type of loss claimable, and any limits 
on recoverability. If we look at these factors, we can then see whether 
there is a relationship between liability in contract and liability in tort. 
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4.2 The Measure of Damages 
4.2.1 Where there is a breach of the duty of care, leading to injury to 
the plaintiff or other loss, the remedy will inevitably be in the form of 
damages. This can cover various types of loss, both reliance loss and 
expectation loss. 
4.2.2 Most actions for breach of the duty of care leading to personal 
injury are brought in the tort of negligence, and the damages here will 
cover loss of earnings. This is effectively expectation loss as it covers 
future potential earnings and is thereby similar to lost profits. It should 
be noted that the courts will calculate the loss on the basis that the 
injured party would have continued in employment, and that he would 
have received some form of incremental rise over the period projected 
forwards. This is effectively putting the plaintiff into the position he 
would have been in, had the tortfeasor not breached the duty of care, 
and this is the case with the implied term to this effect in the contract 
of employment. This is not really reliance based loss, but rather 
expectation loss. 
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4.2.3 Moreover, in recent cases such as SCALLY, the damages have 
been extended to compensate for loss of opportunity in respect of a 
pension scheme. This case was brought in contract, but a similar 
claim was brought in tort in the SPRING case, for loss of opportunity 
in future employment prospects. Here the loss was economic loss, or 
loss of opportunity as per contract law, and as such was seen as a 
logical extension of the duty of care for the physical wellbeing of the 
employee. This is made clear by Lord Woolf in the SPRING case 
where he states; 
'...it also appears to be uncontroversial that if an employer, or 
former employer, by his failure to make proper enquiries, 
causes loss to an employee, it is fair just and reasonable that 
he should be under an obligation to compensate that employee 
for the consequences. This is the position if an employer injures 
an employee physically by failing to exercise reasonable care 
for his safety, and I find it impossible to justify taking a different 
view where an employer, by giving an inaccurate reference 
about his employee, deprives an employee, possibly for a 
considerable period, of the means of earning a livelihood' (31). 
4.2.4 It can be seen that actions in tort and contract now achieve the 
same ends, effectively a claim for loss of expectations. There is 
essentially no difference in the claim made in SCALLY from that 
made in SPRING, and both are based on an extension of the duty of 
care to cover economic well-being. 
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4.3 Non-Pecuniary Loss 
4.3.1 If we look at non-pecuniary loss, we can see that the main 
actions are brought in tort. There is no real problem with claiming for 
pain and suffering as a result of a physical injury, or for grief in the 
case of a relative. We do not have any recent contract based claims 
for personal injury, so it is not possible to state whether non-
pecuniary loss would be claimable here. However, in cases where an 
action has been brought in contract for breach of the duty to treat 
employees with respect, it seems that non-pecuniary loss is not 
claimable, as per the case of BLISS v SOUTH EAST THAMES 
REGIONAL HEALTH AUTHORITY (1985) (32). In this respect, a 
difference still exists between contractual and tortious liability. 
4.4 Remoteness 
4.4.1 With regard to remoteness, it would appear that the rule in 
contract and tort is now very similar. In both situations, the liability is 
essentially based upon the tortious principle of reasonable 
foreseeability. We can see this if we compare the two cases of 
SCALLY and SPRING, brought in contract and tort respectively. In 
both of these cases, the damages recovered were those which the 
courts felt were reasonably foreseeable. In the case of SCALLY, the 
damages could not be those within the contemplation of the 
contracting parties, as the injured party was completely unaware of 
the possibility of a benefit under the pension scheme. In this way, the 
assimilation of the rules for remoteness, is much the same as can be 
found in contracts for services. 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 If we look at contracts of service, we can see how the principles 
of contract and tort have overlapped in respect of the duty of care. 
Here we are concerned with the duty of care for the physical and 
economic well-being of the employee, and well as the wider duty of 
treating employees with respect. It would appear that in all cases, 
there is now concurrent liability in contract and tort. This is clear in 
the case of economic well-being as per SPRING, and by analogy can 
be extended to the duty to treat employees with respect, which is also 
touched upon in SPRING. 
5.1.2 In all of these cases, the essential nature of the liability is fault 
based, and therefore related to the concept of reasonableness. This 
is long established as regards the tortious duties, but I have sought 
to show that contractual duties are essentially based upon this same 
underlying principle, rather than being based upon necessity. 
5.1.3 In addition, it is now arguable that the courts will not allow an 
express contractual term to take priority over the implied duty of care, 
and any express clause which seeks to exclude or limit that duty of 
care will be struck down by the UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS ACT 
1977. As far as positive express terms are concerned, the judges will 
sometimes state quite clearly that the express term must be subject 
to the implied duty of care, as per Stuart-Smith in JOHNSTONE. In 
other cases they will argue that the express term must be applied in 
a reasonable manner, as in AKHTAR and WHITE v REFLECTING 
ROADSTUDS. In both cases, the result is essentially the same. 
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5.2 The Legal Consequences 
5.2.1 The confusion of contractual and tortious liability in this area of 
law has significant consequences. The duty of care is seen as based 
upon the concept of reasonableness, and in determining this the 
courts will tend to chose between two different approaches, namely; 
the efficiency orientated and the socially orientated approach. The 
former approach will lead to a tendency towards strict interpretation 
of the contract terms, so as to ensure that the terms agreed are 
implemented. As it is the employer who usually determines what the 
terms will be, so they will tend to be to his benefit. Alternatively, if the 
courts take the socially orientated approach, they will tend to take the 
part of the employee and thereby limit the effect of the express terms. 
The former approach will maintain the difference between contract 
and tort, whilst the latter approach will tend to obscure the difference. 
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5.2.2 We can see an example of the conflicting approaches in the 
SPRING case during the judicial debate over the issue of the 
reference system in employment. Here Lord Keith sought to limit 
liability for negligently prepared references, on the grounds that 
imposing liability on the basis of HEDLEY BYRNE would effectively 
destroy the reference system as a whole. This is made clear at page 
137 where he states; 
'...If liability in negligence were to follow from a reference 
prepared without reasonable care...(t)hose asked to give a 
reference would be inhibited from speaking frankly lest it should 
be found that they were liable in damages through not taking 
sufficient care in its preparation. They might well prefer, if under 
no legal duty to give a reference, to refrain from doing so at all'. 
(33) 
Essentially the judge is putting the economic benefits of the reference 
system above the interests of the individual employee. The benefits 
to the economy and the insurance business are seen as more 
important here. 
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5.2.3 On the other hand, Lords Goff and Woolf take the socially 
oriented approach in the SPRING case. They put the interests of the 
employee first, rating this as more important than the problems it 
creates for the employer. Lord Goff, for example, is less concerned 
with the need to protect the reference system, than he is with the 
potential effect on an employee's career of a negligently prepared, 
unflattering reference. He makes this clear when he states; 
'...In considering this issue it is necessary to take into account 
contemporary practices in the field of employment; the fact that 
nowadays most employment is conditional upon a reference 
being provided....A development of the law which does no more 
than protect an employee from being deprived of employment 
as a result of a negligent reference would fully justify any limited 
intrusion on freedom of speech'. (34) 
It is clear that the main concern of Lords Goff and Woolf is with the 
interests of the weaker party. This is in clear contrast to Lord Keith, 
who is more interested with the problems faced by the employer and 
business in general. 
5.2.4 It seems to me that the courts are taking the socially orientated 
approach in more recent decisions, and this is taking priority over 
issues of economic efficiency. The underlying concept of 
reasonableness has been used as the justification for this, and so the 
boundary between tortious liability and contractual liability has to a 
large extent been eradicated. As the tort of negligence is usually more 
helpful to the weaker party, in comparison to contract law, we can 
now see why the tortious liability has taken priority. Should the courts 
revert to the earlier efficiency orientated approach, the position would 
be reversed. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
5.3.1 I have tried to argue that the real difference in the courts' 
approach to the duty of care is related to whether they take the 
efficiency orientated or the socially orientated model. In this way, the 
differences between contract and tort have effectively been removed. 
I would tend to argue, that a contract for personal service is quite 
different from a contract for goods, and so different criteria can be 
used to determine compliance. The use of the underlying concept of 
reasonableness means that this area of law is rather different from 
normal contract law, and has more in common with the tort of 
negligence, a phenomenon already remarked upon by other 
academics (35). 
5.3.2 In order to assess whether this situation is unique to English 
Law, it is necessary to look at a comparative legal system to see how 
it has dealt with the same problems. It is this issue which I shall 
address in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Reason for comparative analysis 
1.1.1 I now wish to draw comparisons with the treatment of contract 
and tort in another jurisdiction. My aim is to bring into focus how 
these areas overlap in the other legal system, and to see how this is 
dealt with. We can then consider whether the approach of this other 
system provides any insight into our own treatment of these problems, 
as well as suggesting whether there are any lessons to be learnt. To 
this end, I have chosen to look at the legal system in New Zealand. 
1.1.2 The New Zealand system has been chosen, because it is a 
common law system like our own, and as such the basis of contract 
law is the same. Moreover, there is still a right of appeal from the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal to the Privy Council, and this has 
meant that the United Kingdom and New Zealand systems continue 
to interact. Nevertheless, we will see that in many respects the courts 
in New Zealand have developed a more expansive approach to the 
claiming of economic loss in tort, and a more liberal interpretation of 
contract law principles (1). 
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1.1.3 In this chapter, I wish to use the analytical scheme already 
developed and to apply this to the comparative systems, in order to 
draw out their similarities and differences. For ease of comparison, I 
have indicated the main points of difference in Table 2 at the end of 
the chapter. I intend to refer to the law of the United Kingdom as 
English Law from now on, as this is a more recognisable term, even 
though I appreciate that some of the key cases are not actually 
English. 
2. The Nature of the Liability 
2.1 The basis of the liability 
2.1.1 Contractual liability in English law is based on the existence of 
an exchange of promises, involving a reciprocal agreement between 
the parties involved. This is to be contrasted with tort law liability, 
which is based upon the idea of a general duty imposed by law, 
independent of the wishes of the parties involved. As regards contract 
law, the law in New Zealand operates on a similar basis, except that 
there is a greater willingness to look outside the mechanistic 
principles of offer, acceptance and consideration; as well as a greater 
readiness to consider other factors such as duress and capacity in 
determining whether there is a contract in the first place (2). 
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2.1.2 When we consider the basis of liability in tort law, we can also 
see a significant element of consensus. In both systems, the legal 
duty is seen as being imposed by law and deriving from the need to 
protect the individual. The legal principles here are grounded upon 
the development of the duty of care arising from leading cases such 
as DONAGHUE v STEVENSON (1932). 
2.2 Privity of Contract 
2.2.1 In English law, the development of the doctrine of privity, along 
with that of consideration, was a crucial factor in differentiating 
contract from tort. The rule in English law is quite strict, and prevents 
a third party from enforcing a contract even if it is made for his 
benefit. As we have seen, the doctrine has been much criticised and 
is currently subject to review by the Law Commission. 
2.2.2 New Zealand law originally followed the line set down by 
English law, but this was modified by the CONTRACTS (PRIVITY) 
ACT 1982. This allows a third party to enforce a term of a contract 
made for his benefit, so long as he can show that it was the intention 
of the contracting parties to confer such a benefit, either expressly or 
by implication (3). The contracting parties can vary the third party 
rights, provided they act before that party has altered his position in 
reliance on the contract, or another party has so acted (4). The New 
Zealand reforms are seen as a model for the proposed reforms to 
English Law proposed by the Law Commission. 
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2.2.3 With regard to the situation in tort, the position is the same in 
both jurisdictions, in so far as there is no privity rule as such. 
However, the liability of the defendant is limited by law to a certain 
number of potential plaintiffs, by using other legal concepts as 
controls. In the legal systems of England and New Zealand, the duty 
of care in negligence is limited by the requirements of proximity as 
well as what the courts believe is just and reasonable. 
2.3 Consideration 
2.3.1 In both common law systems, the doctrine of consideration is a 
central feature in contract law, yet the definition of what constitutes 
consideration is extremely vague. In the English law case of 
WILLIAMS V ROFFEY BROTHERS (1990) (5), we have seen that 
consideration is often very easy to prove and this is the position in 
New Zealand law. 
2.3.2 The common law jurisdictions have also seen the development 
of the concept of'promissory estoppel', which has allowed contractual 
liability to be based on reasonable reliance, rather than on the idea 
of reciprocal exchange. We can see how this concept has been 
developed in other common law systems such as Australia (6). In 
New Zealand, the doctrine has been extended in a number of 
decisions, so that it will now be allowed even where there is no pre-
existing contractual relationship, and will act as a cause of action, not 
merely as a defence (7). Moreover, it has been made clear that the 
concept of unconscionability is the justification for the application of 
estoppel, and that it is dependent on the court deciding what is fair, 
rather than enforcing the wishes of the contracting parties (8). 
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2.4 Strict or fault based liability 
2.4.1 The position in English law is that liability in contract is usually 
strict, in so far as it relates to express terms. However, this is subject 
to implied terms, which may import in an element of fault based 
liability (9). In theory, this is based upon the requirements of business 
efficacy or necessity (10), but I have sought to argue that it is really 
based upon reasonableness. Nevertheless, there is an uncertainty 
here over the essential nature of the liability, and to some extent it is 
still seen as strict. 
2.4.2 The New Zealand situation, although deriving from English 
contract law principles, now accepts that reasonableness is the basis 
of the implied terms (11). This is still seen as related to necessity 
(12), but it also allows for the idea of 'good faith' (13). To some 
extent, the New Zealand approach reflects the fact that they have no 
equivalent of the UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS ACT 1977, and 
instead the concept of fairness is imported into the contract itself. This 
can be seen in a raft of legislation which has sought to base liability 
on concepts of fairness, such as the ILLEGAL CONTRACTS ACT 
1970, the CONTRACTUAL MISTAKES ACT 1977 and the 
CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES ACT 1979 (14). In all of these areas of 
law, a wide role is given to the concept of reasonableness in a 
manner which is not evident in English law. In addition, it has been 
supplemented by the common law, which has developed the concept 
of unconscionability to provide a restriction on contracts which are 
seen as unfair (15). 
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2.4.3 When we look at the nature of tortious liability, there is a 
greater degree of consensus. Both English and New Zealand tort law 
are based upon the concept of fault based liability, except in particular 
cases where liability is strict, when the plaintiff is in a weaker position, 
such as a consumer or an employee (16). An example here in UK law 
is the strict liability under the FACTORIES ACT 1961 and associated 
legislation. 
2.5 Expectation or Reliance based 
2.5.1 The liability in contract in English law and New Zealand law, is 
based in theory on the expectation principle; in other words the 
contracting parties expect a certain result to occur if the contract is 
properly performed. However, the liability is often reliance based, and 
linked to the idea of the plaintiff relying upon the promises and 
actions of the defendants. The existence of the reliance principle in 
the common law systems has been noted by various academics (17). 
In this way, the liability in contract can be seen as based upon similar 
principles as the law of tort. 
2.5.2 It would seem that the English and New Zealand systems follow 
similar lines with regard to contract and tort as regards the basis of 
the liability. This reflects the common origin of the two systems of 
legal liability, both of which evolved in English law, before being 
transplanted to New Zealand. 
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2.6 Overview of the Nature of Contractual Liability 
2.6.1 When we compare the two legal systems in respect of the 
nature of contractual liability compared to tort, we can see a number 
of key differences. These stem from the different bases upon which 
contract law is derived. In common law, contractual liability is based 
upon a reciprocal agreement, and as such liability is defined and 
restricted by the twin doctrines of consideration and privity which are 
related to the actions of the contracting parties. The liability is 
generally strict, with reasonableness implied in by various means 
such as implied terms. Moreover, we can see that damages are still 
often related to expectation loss. Yet despite these similarities, we 
can see significant differences in approach between English law and 
New Zealand law as regards contractual liability. 
2.6.2 The New Zealand approach to contract law is more holistic, and 
takes into consideration the subjective intentions of the contracting 
parties, to a greater degree than in English law. This means that they 
are more concerned with issues of fairness and reasonableness as 
defined by the courts, compared to issues of certainty deriving from 
the operation of strictly interpreted rules of contract formation. With 
regard to the nature of the liability, this leads to a tendency to award 
damages on the basis of reasonable expectation or reasonable 
reliance, rather than the bargain principle of traditional contract law. 
This effectively means that the nature of contractual liability is fault 
based and as such becomes indistinguishable from tort (18). 
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2.6.3 The result of this development can be seen in the attitude of 
New Zealand to the doctrines of privity and consideration. Its more 
liberal privity rules mean that there is no need to resort to legal 
fictions, such as 'vicarious immunity", to achieve the intentions of the 
contracting parties in respect of third party interests. It also reduces 
the need to take an alternative action in tort, because the contractual 
action is frustrated by the privity rule. 
2.6.4 In both systems, we can see that the courts will allow a different 
approach to liability depending upon the nature of the contracting 
parties. Where a weaker party is involved, there is a tendency to take 
a more socially orientated approach and to ensure that the agreement 
is fair. The main difference here is that the concept of fairness and 
reasonableness is internalised to an extent within New Zealand 
contract law, whereas English contract law depends to a much 
greater extent on external factors such as implied terms or statutory 
controls. 
3. The Scope of the Liability 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 When we consider the scope of the liability, we are looking at 
the extent of liability and which has primacy over the other. As 
regards the extent of liability, we are essentially concerned with the 
issue of concurrent liability; whereas in considering which type of 
liability has primacy, we need to consider the effect of exemption 
clauses and the issue of contributory negligence. 
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3.2 Concurrent Liability 
3.2.1 In the common law systems, concurrent liability is now accepted 
following such cases as HENDERSON v MERRETT (1994), having 
previously been doubted (19). However, it is still argued that 
contractual liability will take priority over tort. The position in New 
Zealand was originally determined by English law, with concurrent 
liability being effectively rejected in MCLAREN MAYCROFT v 
FLETCHER (20). This position was roundly criticised by various 
academic writers such as Francis and French (21), as well as by legal 
developments in English law cases such as MIDLAND BANK v HETT 
STUBBS (1979) (22). The end result is that concurrent liability has 
now been accepted in New Zealand, in cases such as ROWLANDS 
V COLLOW (1992) and MOUAT v CLARK BOYCE (1992) (23). 
3.3 Exemption Clauses 
3.3.1 In English law, the rule is that express contract terms will 
override legal liability in tort, this being the much-quoted maxim that 
'contract trumps tort'. However, the effect of the UNFAIR CONTRACT 
TERMS ACT 1977 and various consumer protection legislation, has 
effectively limited the use of such clauses in respect of both 
contractual and tortious liability. 
3.3.2 In New Zealand there is no equivalent of the UNFAIR 
CONTRACT TERMS ACT, and so the courts use common law 
controls to effect the same result. This involves a more robust use of 
interpretation to limit the effect of such clauses, and the use of 
consumer protection legislation such as the CONSUMER 
GUARANTEES ACT 1993 (24). Also there is the development of the 
equitable doctrine of unconscionability to which we have made 
reference above at Section 2.4.2. 
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3.4 Contributory Negligence 
3.4.1 When we look at the impact of contributory negligence in the 
two systems, we find a similar pattern. In English law, we have seen 
that contributory negligence is not available in contract law, unless the 
liability is fault based, such as a contractual duty of care (25). The 
New Zealand situation is similar to that in the UK, with statutory 
apportionment provided for in the CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
ACT 1947 based on the UK LAW REFORM (CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE) ACT 1945. This limits contributory negligence to fault 
based contractual liability (26), and it is seen as necessary that 
negligence should be 'an essential ingredient' of the case, even if it 
is not the actual source of the duty (27). However, the New Zealand 
Law Commission has recently recommended that the Act be amended 
to allow for a statutory right of apportionment for all breaches of 
contract (28). 
3.5 Conclusion 
3.5.1 In the case of exemption clauses, it would seem that there is 
a greater need for a formal system of control in English law, where 
the liability of the contracting parties is related to their promise. In the 
New Zealand system, where liability is more related to fault, such 
clauses would not be allowed to operate in the first place. 
3.5.2 Similarly, we can see that contributory negligence acts as an 
express countervailing factor in contract law, but it is limited in its 
scope. Where applicable, it is effectively limiting liability to what is 
reasonable. 
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4. The Extent of the Remedy 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 In assessing the extent of the remedy available in contract and 
tort we are looking at various aspects which define and limit the 
damages available. These include the measure of loss; as well as 
limiting factors such as the ability to claim for non-pecuniary loss, the 
remoteness rule and limitation periods. 
4.2 Measure of loss 
4.2.1 The measure of loss is related to the nature of the liability, 
either expectation based or reliance based. The English law position 
is that damages for contract law are assessed on the basis of either 
expectation or reliance loss, depending upon the circumstances of the 
breach, whilst damages for tort are usually based upon reliance loss. 
There is a possibility to claim expectation loss in tort by way of 
economic loss, where it falls within the bounds of negligent 
misstatement as defined in HEDLEY BYRNE v HELLER (1963) (29). 
This is not usually allowed for negligent actions, as per MURPHY v 
BRENTWOOD (1990) (30). Nevertheless this area of law is now 
uncertain following the decision in HENDERSON v MERRETT (1994), 
where claims for economic loss have been allowed in respect of 
negligent actions. 
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4.2.2 The developments in New Zealand are the same as regards 
contractual damages, although some legislation such as the FAIR 
TRADING ACT 1986 would seem to limit losses to reliance loss as in 
tort. However, in the case of tortious liability, a significant divergence 
has occurred, with New Zealand being much more willing to allow 
claims for economic loss, even in cases of negligent actions. In effect, 
the courts have continued to follow the principle set in ANNS v 
MERTON LBC (1978) (31), rather than to take the line set in 
MURPHY V BRENTWOOD (1990) (32). This difference of approach 
was recently confirmed and approved by the Privy Council, when 
hearing an appeal from the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
INVERCARGILL CITY COUNCIL v HAMLIN (1996) (33), a case which 
was almost identical to MURPHY. The reason for the difference in 
approach was seen as clearly due to policy factors (34). 
4.3 Non-Pecuniary Loss 
4.3.1 The English law position here is in a state of flux. The general 
view is still that damages for non-pecuniary loss cannot be claimed 
in contract but only in tort, following ADDIS v GRAMOPHONE CO 
LTD (1909) (35). However, it is now accepted that such damages can 
be claimed where the purpose of the contract includes providing 
peace of mind as in the so-called 'holiday cases' (36). Moreover, a 
more liberal approach can be seen in some employment cases, such 
as the recently decided MALIK v BANK OF CREDIT & COMMERCE 
INTERNATIONAL SA (IN LIQUIDATION) (1997) (37). 
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4.3.2 In the above respect, English law is simply following the lead set 
in New Zealand, where such losses have been claimable in contract 
for several years, both in contracts for services (38) and in contracts 
of service (39). The more advanced position in New Zealand has 
already been noted by academic writers (40). Nevertheless, the 
evidence is that the New Zealand courts would not allow such losses 
in the case of strict contractual duties, such as in the sale of goods, 
or where the plaintiffs were a purely commercial organisation (41). 
The situation for tort law is the same as in English law. 
4.4 Remoteness 
4.4.1 In English law, we have seen that there is a difference between 
the remoteness rule for contract and tort. In contract, it is based upon 
the reasonable contemplation of the parties, and in tort it is based on 
reasonable foreseeability (42), even though the difference is often 
confused. 
4.4.2 The English law position is still broadly followed in New 
Zealand, although there is more evidence of the rules being confused, 
and even assimilated. For example, Cooke P in McELROY MILNE v 
COMMERCIAL ELECTRONICS (43) uses the phrase 'not unlikely' to 
define the contractual remoteness rule, a term which suggests an 
objective test similar to that in tort. In addition, there are suggestions 
in ROWLANDS v COLLOW (1992), that the remoteness rule should 
vary according to the nature of the parties involved, rather than the 
nature of the liability (44). Overall, there is evidence that the 
distinction drawn in English law between the different remoteness 
rules is not seen as a useful one, and that the tortious rule should be 
adopted in both contract and tort (45). 
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4.5 Limitation Periods 
4.5.1 A key difference between contract and tort in English law is the 
different limitation period. Although usually six years for contract and 
tort, the limitation period starts to run from a different time. In contract 
the time limit runs from the breach of contract, whilst in tort it runs 
from the time when the damage occurs. The latter often occurs at a 
later date, thereby allowing a longer period of time before the 
limitation period elapses, and making it an advantage to take an 
action in tort. 
4.5.2 In New Zealand law, the rules on limitation traditionally followed 
the English law pattern with a different commencement time in 
contract and tort (46). However, in recent cases, the courts have 
started to alter the rules in various ways. Firstly, there is a move 
towards starting the commencement of the limitation period at the 
same time for contract and tort. Also, in the recent INVERCARGILL 
case, it was argued that the commencement time for latent damage 
should begin when the damage was discovered and not when it 
occurred, in effect challenging the principle laid down in PIRELLI 
GENERAL CABLE WORKS V OSCAR FABER & PTNRS (1983) (47). 
The position is that the limitation rules are becoming more flexible in 
contract and tort, so removing the need to take a tortious action in 
order to avoid the problems of a restricted contractual limitation 
period. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
4.6.1 When we look at the extent of the remedies, we can see how 
the differences between contract and tort are being eroded. As far as 
the measure of damages is concerned, the right to claim expectation 
loss in tort is being developed in New Zealand, as well as arguably 
in English law. The area of non-pecuniary loss is also one of change, 
with both New Zealand and English law gradually allowing such 
claims in contract. Finally, the remoteness rule for contract is 
increasingly being based upon reasonable foreseeability, the rule 
normally associated with tort. 
4.6.2 The main differences which still apply are in the area of 
limitation periods, where English law still operates very different rules 
in contract and tort, whilst these are being assimilated in New 
Zealand. Other than this, the issue of economic loss is still far from 
clear in English law as the rule in MURPHY v BRENTWOOD still 
limits the tortious remedies, whilst the position in New Zealand 
appears more clear cut. 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1 General Overview 
5.1.1 When we compare the systems operating in English Law as well 
as in New Zealand, we can see certain interesting trends. These 
relate to the basis of liability, which in the common law systems relies 
to a large extent on the courts enforcing the freely negotiated 
promises of the contracting parties, rather than imposing their own 
ideas of right and wrong. In English law, there is a tendency to give 
greater scope to the impact of market forces by basing liability on the 
terms agreed by the parties, whether or not they are negotiated from 
an equal bargaining position. Also, there is more emphasis on the 
need for a rule of privity as well as the existence of consideration. In 
New Zealand Law, there is a greater willingness to import in ideas of 
fairness and justice into the contract (48), as well as a greater 
willingness to relax the rule on privity. This means that the courts are 
able to take a socially orientated approach, and to support the weaker 
party where they think that this is appropriate. 
5.1.2 Nevertheless, the two systems ultimately achieve similar results 
but by different means (49). English law seeks to ground liability on 
a strict adherence to the terms of the agreement, but this is modified 
by implying terms into the contract, both in common law and in 
statute, which tend to introduce the concept of reasonableness. In the 
New Zealand system, this concept is introduced into contract by virtue 
of the fault based nature of the liability, and the use of equitable 
notions such as unconscionability. In effect, the controls in English 
law are externalised, whilst those in the New Zealand system are 
more often internalised. 
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5.1.3 The internalising of the controls in the New Zealand system has 
various consequences. Firstly, it effectively reduces the difference 
between contract and tort, as the liability is essentially based upon 
sinnilar principles. This can be seen in the fault based nature of 
liability and the dispensing of the need for privity and consideration. 
It can also be seen in the fact that damages for contract and tort are 
usually based upon the same principles, so that the type of legal 
liability is not really important. This can be seen in the comments of 
Gault LJ in MOUAT v CLARK BOYCE where he states; 
'It would be artificial if in a case such as this where one breach 
of duty arose in effect upon the entering into a contract of 
retainer the remedy should be different depending upon whether 
this is regarded as tortious or contractual negligence'. (50) 
5.1.4 A second factor is that the approximation of contract and 
tortious liability, and the extent of their remedies, reduces the need to 
take one type of action instead of the other. In the common law 
jurisdictions this is a problem, now that concurrent liability has been 
accepted. The main problems arise where the gap between contract 
and tortious liability is greatest, namely in the areas of privity, non-
pecuniary loss, contributory negligence and the rules on limitation. An 
approximation of the two types of liability, at least as regards duty of 
care type liability, would prevent the need to take the alternative 
action, and would avoid many of the legal uncertainties that perplex 
common law jurisdictions. 
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5.1.5 Where there is a narrower difference between the contractual 
and the tortious systems of liability, there is a greater tendency to 
concentrate on the nature of the relationships between the parties. 
This is because the common underlying theme of reasonableness, 
focuses the judicial mind on what is fair or reasonable; and this is 
likely to be determined according to how the courts perceive the 
nature of the relationship between plaintiff and defendant. This can be 
seen in New Zealand, where the courts have raised the issue of 
taking a different approach in relation to the nature of the contract, as 
with the issue of non-pecuniary loss (51). 
5.1.6 What we can see here are two different approaches, both of 
them effectively achieving a similar result. In general, I would argue 
that the New Zealand system is to be preferred, because it enables 
the court to base liability upon the principles of reasonableness in 
both contract and tort, and so provides a system which is both fairer 
and more logical. The English law system suffers from the tension 
between its strict market-driven contract law liability, and the attempt 
to make it fairer by imposing external restrictions. In effect we are 
bringing in concepts of reasonableness 'by the back door'. This can 
lead to problems where the attempt to imply in the concept of 
reasonableness is restricted, such as in the case of non standard-
form commercial contracts, where it may be possible to exclude the 
operation of both common law and statutory controls. 
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5.1.7 Moreover, the problem of differing regimes for contract and tort 
causes unnecessary litigation, due to the availability of concurrent 
liability. The New Zealand system avoids some of the problems of 
English law, as a result of its more liberal rules on privity, and the 
ability to claim 'economic loss' in tort. However, it still does not 
obviate the need to take alternative action in order to deal with the 
problem of different limitation periods, and the requirement for 
consideration in contract. As a result, litigants still continue to exploit 
their right to take actions in the alternative, causing the law to remain 
unsettled. 
5.2 Conclusion 
5.2.1 I hope that this comparative analysis has thrown into relief some 
of the ways in which English law operates, and the alternative options 
available. I have argued that the New Zealand system has much 
more to commend it than the English system, and it may be possible 
for English law to develop more along these lines, given the similar 
nature of our legal systems. In this respect, I would argue that the key 
issue will be the continuing availability of concurrent liability in 
contract and tort, and in particular its destabilising effect on the 
overall framework of legal liability. 
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CONCLUSION 
1. Introduction 
1.1 General Points 
1.1.1 In concluding my study of the overlap between contract law and 
the tort of negligence, I should like to consider three main issues. 
Firstly, I wish to draw attention to the areas where contract and tort 
have become interlinked, as well as remaining distinct, and to explain 
why this has happened. Secondly, I wish to consider alternative 
frameworks which seek to draw a boundary between contract and tort. 
Finally, I would like to suggest how the boundary could be drawn, and 
how that links into my understanding of the difference between these 
two areas of law. 
2. The Similarities between Contract and Tort 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 In this thesis, I have been focusing on the interrelationship 
between contract and tort, in the area where they both involve a duty 
of care. To this extent, I have only been looking at contracts involving 
a duty of care, such as contracts for services and contracts of service. 
As regards tortious liability, I have only looked at the tort of 
negligence in so far as it is based upon a duty of care, and not where 
the liability is strict. 
Page 156 
2.1.2 Inherently, the legal liability for contract and tort is different 
because of the different nature of the legal duty. In contract it arises 
from a breach of promise, whilst in tort it arises from a breach of the 
duty of care (1). Yet we can see a considerable overlap between the 
areas of contract and tort, when we look at the nature and scope of 
the liability and the extent of the remedy. The differences which were 
identified in the traditional approach have to a large extent 
disappeared, and we can see this when we compare the present 
position on Table 3, at the end of the chapter, with the earlier Table 
1 at the end of chapter 1. 
2.1.3 A key reason for the confusion between the two areas of law is 
the manner in which they originally developed. Both contract and tort 
can be traced back to the action on the case for misfeasance, which 
arose from the commission of a wrong by the defendant. Although 
there was not always a pre-existing relationship, there was an 
expectation that the tortfeasor would act with care so as to look after 
the interests of the plaintiff. In effect, we can see liability here based 
upon reasonable reliance. The development of the promise based 
contractual remedy also embraced the idea of reasonable reliance, 
although in the period of 'laissez faire' economic philosophy, this was 
not often clearly identified. In the 20th century, the idea of reliance 
has reasserted itself, and the similarities between contract and tort 
have emerged once more. 
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2.1.4 A second key factor is the common ideological base which 
underpins contract and tort. I have identified two main ideological 
approaches which apply across the contract/tort divide, these being 
the efficiency orientated approach and the socially orientated 
approach. I believe that the courts tend to take one or other of these 
approaches when determining their idea of reasonableness, and in so 
doing, take into consideration the nature of the parties involved and 
the context in which they operate. The extent to which they will take 
the one approach or the other, will depend not only on the nature of 
the parties, but the attitude of the judges. There is evidence that in 
the late 1980's, judges tended to take a more efficiency orientated 
line with greater concern for certainty and business efficiency, as 
illustrated in decisions such as MURPHY v BRENTWOOD and REID 
V RUSH TOMPKIN. There is now evidence that the courts are moving 
against this trend, and towards a more socially orientated approach 
in cases such as SMITH v BUSH and SPRING v GUARDIAN 
ASSURANCE. 
2.2. Similarities in tlie Nature of the Liability 
2.2.1 When we consider the nature of the liability, we can see how 
the traditional differences between contract and tort have been 
effectively minimised. The key factors in the traditional analysis which 
differentiated contract from tort, were privity, consideration and the 
strict type of liability. These reflected the fact that liability was seen 
as expectation based, and not reliance based. 
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2.2.2 We can see the gradual erosion of the doctrine of privity in 
English law, with the development of various exceptions to the rule, 
including most recently the concept of 'vicarious immunity' (2); whilst 
the proposed reform of this area of law suggested by the Law 
Commission, will effectively undermine the whole principle itself (3). 
Under the proposed reform, a third party will be able to enforce a 
contract if he can show that it purports to confer a benefit upon him, 
and that the contracting parties intended the third party to be able to 
enforce the contract. (4). The contracting parties cannot modify the 
contract once the third party can show he has relied upon it (5), so 
that the liability is essentially based upon 'reasonable reliance'(6). 
2.2.3 As such, the contractual liability is analogous to the tortious duty 
of care where liability is decided upon similar principles, and the 
courts use the concepts of proximity, foreseeability and their own idea 
of what is just and reasonable, simply as means of determining where 
reasonable reliance should end (7). I would argue that it is very 
difficult to distinguish between the 'reasonable reliance' referred to by 
Adams, Beatson & Beyleveld, as well as Atiyah (8), and the concept 
of 'reasonable expectation' which is asserted as the underpinning 
concept of contract law (9). 
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2.2.4 The doctrine of consideration has always been a problem, not 
least because it is not clearly quantified and so can become quite 
nebulous (10). The result is that the courts have tended in recent 
years to look for an element of reliance in determining whether there 
is any consideration, rather than looking for simply an exchange of 
goods or promises. Again, it would seem that liability is based on 
reasonable reliance, where the courts consider whether the 
contracting party could have expected the other party to believe that 
it was legally bound. This is seen as the idea of 'reasonable 
expectation', but it is intrinsically related to reliance, as the parties' 
expectations are based upon their reliance on how the other party will 
ac t So if we consider WILLIAMS v ROFFEY BROS, it is clear that the 
plaintiffs relied upon the other party making the extra payment, as this 
is what they had been led to expect would happen. In the seminal tort 
case of HEDLEY BYRNE v HELLER, the reasonable reliance arises 
from the fact that the plaintiff could expect the defendant bank not to 
give him important information, without ensuring that it was correct. 
Again we can see the analogy between contract and tort. 
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2.2.5 Once we see liability based upon reasonable reliance, then 
there is a tendency for liability to become fault based and related to 
the underlying concept of 'reasonableness'. This is not necessarily 
true, as it could be argued that it is reasonable for a party to rely 
upon the other party conforming to the strict requirements of an 
agreed contract, however unreasonable those terms might be. 
Nevertheless, the tendency is for the courts to see reasonable 
reliance as based upon compliance with reasonable terms, and to see 
unreasonable terms as ones to which the other party could not have 
been expected to agree. The whole battery of common law rules in 
contract is then turned upon those terms in order to modify them, 
using the concepts of mistake, duress or undue influence. Onerous 
terms are dealt with in the same way as exemption clauses, as they 
are often seeking to achieve a similar end by placing the burdens 
onto the other party. The fact that exemption clauses are controlled 
on the basis of reasonableness, has meant that onerous clauses are 
controlled in the same way (11). The end result is that the strict 
nature of liability is undermined, and replaced by a fault based liability 
underpinned by the concept of reasonableness. 
2.2.6 Overall, we can see that the concept of reasonable reliance is 
now permeating contract law liability, and as such undermining some 
of the key defining aspects of contract law. As a result the difference 
between contract and tort is becoming more difficult to sustain (12). 
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2.3 Similarities in the scope of tlie liability 
2.3.1 The key problem here arises from the fact that the liability is 
often concurrent, as regards duty of care type liabilities. This means 
that both areas of law are likely to try and expand at the expense of 
each other. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the problems 
of privity and limitation periods in contract have forced litigants to 
seek alternative remedies in the tort of negligence (13). 
2.3.2 The traditional view is that contract law determines the extent 
of the liability and so cannot be exceeded by tortious liability, but this 
leads to various problems. If we argue that the underlying basis of 
both contract and tort, with regard to the duty of care, is based on 
reasonable reliance, we could argue that they will be coextensive. 
Certainly contract law could not exceed the tortious liability, although 
it is arguable that it could be more limited, as the contract may not 
seek to cover liability in certain areas (14). 
2.3.3 This issue impinges on the primacy of liability, because the idea 
that contract can override tort is put in question if contracting parties 
cannot exclude tortious liability by seeking to exclude it by definition 
(15); whilst the impact of common law and statute will require most 
exemption clauses to be reasonable. What contract law can do, is to 
reallocate liability within a framework determined by tort on the basis 
of reasonableness. For example, contracting businesses could agree 
to relocate insurance liability (16), but they could not pass off liability 
in this way if it was seen as unreasonable (17). The same approach 
is taken with onerous clauses, which cannot be relied upon if 
unreasonable, and will be struck down if they involve a breach of the 
tortious duty of care (18). 
Page 162 
2.3.4 Finally, we can note how the impact of tortious principles can be 
seen in the development of contributory negligence as a defence to 
contract law liability, where it is based upon the duty of care. We can 
see how this is analogous to mitigation of loss in contract law, as 
remarked on in recent cases (19). Again we can see that the primacy 
of tort law is asserted. 
2.4 Similarities in the Extent of tlie Remedy 
2.4.1 The question of determining the extent of the remedy has been 
affected by two key problems. Firstly, it is not easy to distinguish 
between the different types of damages in either contract or tort. In 
contract, there is confusion between reliance, restitution and 
expectation damages, and in tort between damages for direct loss, 
consequential loss and economic loss. Moreover, it is clear that these 
definitions of damages overlap, so that economic loss is similar to, 
but not exactly the same as, expectation loss (20). It is not surprising 
that the courts themselves have become confused as to the 
difference between the contract measure of loss and the tortious 
measure. In the case of SOUTH AUSTRALIA ASSET MANAGEMENT 
CORP V YORK MONTAGUE LTD (1996) (21) it has been argued that 
the courts imposed a contractual measure of damages, in a tortious 
duty of care situation (22). 
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2.4.2 In addition, this confusion has been exacerbated by the 
increasing efforts of litigants to sue in tort in order to avoid the 
restrictions of contract law, such as privity and limitation periods. 
These plaintiffs have been trying to obtain damages similar to those 
which they would expect in contract, even though the traditional 
position was that damages were quite different and usually more 
restrictive. This distinction was weakened by the development of 
economic loss for negligent misstatement arising from HEDLEY 
BYRNE V HELLER (1963), as this allowed damages which covered 
loss of profits (23). This led to the need to draw a distinction between 
negligent statement and negligent action, which proved to be very 
difficult to sustain (24). Similarly, the distinction between direct loss, 
consequential losses and economic loss has also been difficult to 
define, and has led to problems with plaintiffs arguing that the 
damages were not economic loss but direct losses, and so claimable 
in negligence (25). 
2.4.3 The end result is that the distinction between contract and tort 
damages has become blurred. This can be seen in the case of 
HENDERSON v MERRETT (1994), as well as other cases arising 
from the Lloyds debacle (26). Here the plaintiffs have been able to 
obtain contractual type damages for loss of profits, even though the 
action was for the negligent handling of an investment. It is difficult to 
see how this can be differentiated from other types of negligence in 
the provision of services, such as the installation of a faulty heating 
system or the construction of a faulty house. It is clear that the 
decision in MURPHY v BRENTWOOD is now in need of 
reconsideration. 
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2.4.4 The confusion we find with regard to the measure of damages 
is also reflected in other aspects of damages. The remoteness rule 
in contract and tort has often been confused in the past, and there is 
plenty of evidence to suggest that judges now effectively see the rule 
as the same in both (27). In addition, the same confusion can be 
seen in the area of non-pecuniary loss, where the traditional position 
that such damages are not allowed in contract law has effectively 
been overturned, at least in those contracts where there is an 
underlying duty of care. 
2.4.5 Indeed, the only area where the contract/tort divide has 
remained essentially unscathed is the differential limitation periods 
where the more advantageous situation is usually in tort. As we have 
seen, this difference is a key factor in seeking to outflank contract by 
taking an action in tort. The confusion in the extent of the remedy 
between contract and tort has led to some academics suggesting an 
alternative classification of the law of obligations (28). 
2.5 Problems arising from the similarities. 
2.5.1 The growing confusion between contract and tort has caused 
several problems. Firstly, there is uncertainty over the basis of the 
'duty of care', which arises in both contract and tort. In tort it is seen 
as based on the concept of 'reasonableness'; whereas in contract it 
is still argued that the duty of care is implied in on the basis of 
necessity (29). I have argued that the basis is reasonableness in both 
cases, but this is still a matter of dispute. 
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2.5.2 There is also a question over the scope of contract and tort. The 
traditional idea that contract overrides tort is difficult to sustain, if we 
are referring to contracts involving a duty of care, such as the 
provision of services. Yet the recent Law Commission on privity of 
contract and the rights of third parties (30), has suggested that the 
contracting parties should be able to exclude or limit liability by 
express term, and that the term would not be subject to the 
requirements of the UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS ACT 1977. This 
means that it would be possible to exclude liability to a third party, in 
a contract based upon a duty of care, even if the exclusion clause 
would normally be seen as unreasonable. This does not accord with 
the idea that third party rights are based on 'reasonable expectations', 
but instead elevates above this the contractual intentions of the 
parties. This has been attacked by academics (31) on the grounds 
that the basis of contract is legitimate expectations, which implies the 
requirement that the reasonable expectations of the parties should 
prevail. It is clear that the conflict between these two approaches has 
not yet been resolved. 
2.5.3 Finally, the confusion over the extent of the remedies means 
that courts tend to confuse the nature of the damages. This in itself 
can lead to further attempts to weaken the divide, by persuading 
litigants to pursue the tortious action in the belief that they can secure 
contractual remedies. It is this type of action which has done most to 
undermine the barriers between contract and tort, by testing and 
exploiting the area of uncertainty opened by the HEDLEY BYRNE 
decision. 
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3. Alternative Frameworks 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 In order to deal with the confusion engendered by the 
assimilation of contract and the tort of negligence, I wish to consider 
three possible alternative frameworks. These I have referred to as the 
contractual framework, the tortious framework and the integrated 
framework. 
3.2 Contractual Framework 
3.2.1 This framework sees the present confusion in the law as having 
arisen as a consequence of two main problems; the deficiencies of 
the traditional contract law remedy which forces litigants to turn to 
alternative forms of action, and the existence of concurrent liability 
which allows them to find a remedy in tort. The way to deal with the 
problem is to remedy the deficiencies in contract law, and to operate 
a strict rule of separation similar to the French rule of 'non cumul'. 
Such a view draws inspiration from developments in France and other 
civil law jurisdictions, as well as in the United States, and is supported 
by academics such as Markesinis and Burrows (32). 
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3.2.2 The key reforms in contract law would be the removal of the 
restrictions of the privity doctrine, and eliminating the requirement for 
consideration where it could be shown that there is consensus 
between the parties. Liability here would be based on principles of 
reasonable reliance, which means that in duty of care situations it 
would be based on reasonableness, and even in contracts for the 
supply of goods it would accord with reasonable commercial 
expectations. The rules which define the extent of the remedies would 
be modified, to equate contract with tort in respect of non-pecuniary 
loss, contributory negligence, remoteness and limitation periods. The 
domain of contract law would be protected by the removal of the right 
of concurrent liability. 
3.2.3 This framework would allow contract law to play a major role in 
the law of obligations, and restrict the role of tort to situations where 
there was no contractual nexus. However, there is still a problem, as 
to where the contractual nexus ceases to exist. Clearly it will cover 
parties involved in so-called 'network contracts', and this will include 
employees (33). The problem is that the courts may be tempted to 
create a contractual nexus, in situations where it is not clear that it 
should exist at all, as in CLARKE v THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN 
(1897) (34), so we could find that most duty of care situations would 
be fitted into a contractual context. 
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3.3 The tortious framework 
3.3.1 An alternative framework would be to group all the duty of care 
type liability under one area of law, which would be part of the tort of 
negligence. This would expand the area of tortious liability at the 
expense of contract, limiting the latter to those areas of strict liability 
which are result based, such as the sale of goods. Again there would 
be no right of concurrent liability. Essentially this is the approach 
favoured by Stapleton (35). 
3.3.2 The main problem here is that it can be difficult in practice to 
distinguish between duty of care type liability, and strict liability in 
contract. This can be seen in the provision of a contract which 
involves the supply of goods and labour, such as the repair of a car 
or the installation of double glazing. The litigant would have to know 
in advance whether the fault arose from the quality of the goods, or 
the fitting of those goods, as he could not bring an action in the 
alternative. Even some contracts, which are purely service contracts, 
can be seen as based on expected results (36). 
3.3.3 A further consideration is how far even the contracts for the sale 
of goods should be seen as purely result based, and involving strict 
liability. Although this is the traditional view (37), the SALE OF 
GOODS ACT 1979 is permeated by the idea of reasonableness. The 
definition of 'satisfactory quality' (38) implies the standard which a 
'reasonable' person would expect of the goods, whilst 'fitness for 
purpose' (39) requires the goods to be 'reasonably' fit for the purpose 
specified by the buyer. Certainly some academics see a strong 
influence of the concept of reasonableness in this area of law (40). It 
would seem that strict liability is only really applicable where the end 
results are specifically identified, such as a requirement to supply 
goods of a specific dimension (41). 
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3.4 The Integrated framework 
3.4.1 This arises from the view that the boundary between contract 
and tort is purely artificial. It seeks to create a general law of 
obligations, in which contract and tort are combined along with 
restitution. We can see this idea in the views of Cooke and Oughton 
(42), as well as Cane (43). However, it is best expressed in the work 
of Atiyah, who sees such a generalised law of obligation based upon 
the twin pillars of reciprocal benefit and reasonable reliance (44). This 
idea of reasonable reliance is difficult to distinguish in practice from 
the idea of 'legitimate expectation' or 'reasonable expectation' used 
by other academics (45). Indeed, it could be argued that the two 
concepts are effectively two sides of the same coin. 
3.4.2 The key problem with the integrated framework is that it 
effectively eliminates the idea of free will by way of contractual 
intention. In effect, all liability is imposed by the law along the lines of 
reasonableness defined by the courts, and the role of the contracting 
parties is to make minor adjustments where these are accepted as 
reasonable. This framework still incorporates a separate role for 
contract and tort, but the line between them is very blurred. 
3.4.3 To some extent, we can see this framework being developed in 
New Zealand law with its changes to contract and tort law, and the 
existence of concurrent liability. This system favours the plaintiff in 
extending his rights of action in contract and tort, but it 
correspondingly imposes upon the defendant a considerable degree 
of uncertainty, as he is less able to determine the extent of his 
liability. In particular, he cannot easily determine whether he is likely 
to be sued in contract or tort, and so he will find it difficult to arrange 
even a reasonable limitation of his liability. 
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4. A Possible Classification 
4.1 Underpinning concepts 
4.1.1 In order to arrive at a possible classification, we need to be 
aware of the purpose of the two areas of law. The law of contract 
seeks to enforce agreed arrangements between one or more parties, 
whilst the law of tort seeks to remedy general wrongs deemed to be 
actionable by society. It is for this reason that the basis of contract is 
seen as enforcing contractual intention or the reasonable expectation 
of the parties, whilst tort is seen as relating to reasonable reliance. 
Yet I have argued that the duty of care liability can be seen as 
relating to reasonable reliance or reasonable expectation, and to 
some extent the terms are easily confused. Arguably, the parties rely 
upon the other party doing what they would expect him to do, so that 
in effect reasonable reliance and reasonable expectation are 
analogous terms. 
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4.1.2 It could also be argued that in duty of care obligations, whether 
in contract or tort, the law implies that the intentions of the contracting 
parties are reasonable, and so contractual intention can also be 
equated with reasonable reliance or reasonable expectation. The 
difference arises where the liability is strict, as in the sale of goods or 
provision of a specified service. But in the area of the duty of care, 
the underlying nature of the liability is the same, and so the general 
legal framework should incorporate both of these concepts of liability. 
The role of contract law here is to enable the two parties to make 
some modification to the general legal liability determined by society, 
as long as that modification is reasonable. In this way, risk can be 
reallocated between parties, where they are of similar bargaining 
power, and the reallocation is not seen as unreasonable. We can 
adopt different levels of liability according to the willingness of the 
other party to pay a price, so long as there is a bottom line 
determined by the law. For example, a courier service may have a 
duty of care not to allow goods in its possession to be damaged, and 
should not be able to exclude liability entirely in respect of a 
consumer; but they could agree on a variety of levels of 
compensation, depending upon the price the consumer was prepared 
to pay. 
4.1.3 In effect, I would argue that we must have a separate area of 
contract and tort, but that reasonableness must be the underpinning 
basis of both, at least as far as duty of care type liability is involved. 
In effect, this involves a hierarchy of systems, in which the primary 
framework of liability should be based on reasonable reliance or 
reasonable expectation similar to tort, whilst the secondary framework 
should be based upon bargain principles, similar to traditional contract 
law (46). The tortious type liability should determine the all embracing 
nature of liability, but it should be possible for contracting parties to 
modify this within bounds set down by law. 
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4.1.4 As a result, it would be necessary for contract law to be 
reformed by removing the rule on privity and replacing the doctrine of 
consideration with one based on establishing consensus, where 
consideration would play an evidential role. In addition, the limitation 
periods should be assimilated in contract and tort, as should the rules 
for calculating damages, including the rules on remoteness and the 
claiming of non-pecuniary loss. This would remove the need to take 
action in tort, and so would allow us to introduce a 'non cumul' type 
rule preventing concurrent liability. The focus of the divide would then 
be the point at which we could see a contractual relationship existing. 
This would include contracting parties and third parties, who could 
reasonably be seen as being entitled to benefit. The courts would 
have to determine which parties could be brought within this 
relationship, and this could include beneficiaries of a network contract, 
or employees of a contracting party. It is also arguable that this could 
cover beneficiaries of a will, as in WHITE v JONES (1995). However, 
there would have to be a 'cut off point, so that not all relationships 
would be construed as contractual. For example, occupiers of 
property would not be seen as having a contractual relationship with 
persons passing by their premises, so that any injury which may befall 
the latter would only be actionable in tort. 
Page 173 
4.1.5 The key underlying principle here is that liability should be 
based on the concept of 'reasonableness'. This brings us back to the 
key problem of how this should be determined by the courts. I have 
tried to argue that when dealing with actions in contract or tort, the 
courts have tended to take one of two approaches, an efficiency 
orientated one or a socially oriented one. The main reason for 
adopting one approach or the other has often been the relationship 
between the parties involved. Consequently, an efficiency orientated 
approach has usually been taken where the two parties are of similar 
bargaining power, such as in PHOTO PRODUCTION v SECURICOR 
(1980) in contract, or CAPARO v DICKMAN (1990) in tort. In contrast, 
a socially orientated approach has been used where the parties are 
of differing bargaining power, such as in SCHROEDER v 
MACCAULEY in contract, and SMITH v BUSH in tort. 
4.1.6 It is arguable that some judges tend to one approach rather 
than the other, so that Lord Keith and also Lord Bridge have tended 
to take the efficiency approach, whilst Lord Goff, Lord Templeman 
and Browne-Wilkinson have tended to take the socially orientated 
approach. It is also arguable that there has been a shift over time, 
with one approach being favoured at the expense of the other at 
different periods. It would appear that the efficiency approach was 
more prevalent in the earlier cases, such as LISTER v ROMFORD 
ICE & COLD STORAGE (1957) and REID v RUSH TOMPKIN (1979), 
but less so in the more recent cases such as SMITH v BUSH (1990) 
and SPRING v GUARDIAN ASSURANCE (1994). 
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4.1.7 Inevitably, the approach which prevails reflects the attitudes of 
the times, and whether there is greater concern with business 
efficiency or the interests of the weaker members of society. 
However, in general, I would argue that the socially orientated 
approach should be preferred in most cases, unless there is clear 
evidence that the parties involved were aware of their potential 
liabilities and able to take action to protect themselves. Usually 
stronger parties will not need to go to law to protect their interests, so 
it is often the weaker parties who turn to law for protection, such as 
consumers and employees. 
4.1.8 I could argue that ultimately there is an interrelationship 
between both approaches to some degree. In all cases the court is 
deciding what it feels is reasonable in accordance with the 
circumstances, and it may feel that what is reasonable where the 
parties are of equal bargaining power, is different where they are not. 
In effect, reasonable businessmen would feel that it was fair for other 
parties on an equal footing to deliver strictly on their promises, but 
that this should not be required of a party who has been forced into 
a contract through ignorance or duress, or even lack of bargaining 
power. Certainly, when we refer to the idea of reasonable reliance 
and reasonable expectation, we are using terms which denote that 
the attitude of the parties has to be based on a set of principles 
related to reasonable behaviour, and this is far removed from a 
mechanistic system which enforces all promises, however obtained. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
5.1 Final Thoughts 
5.1.1 Overall, we can see that the issue of the contract/tort divide is 
a complex one involving a whole number of interrelated issues. In this 
thesis, I have tried to show that the growing assimilation between the 
two areas of law is based not only on a common heritage, but 
common underpinning ideological principles. One of the problems of 
our case based system, is that we do not always consider the 
underlying principles in a logical manner, and instead allow the law 
to develop in a certain direction in response to specific problems, as 
with the rapid growth of actions for negligent misstatement. 
5.1.2 I would argue that we need to consider a more logical codified 
system of law, so that we can see the underlying principles upon 
which law is based. I also feel that we need to ensure that these 
areas of law are more clearly defined, and less open to erosion by the 
development of unrestrained litigation. As such, we could learn much 
from the civil law systems of France and Germany, and develop a 
general law of obligations with different categories clearly marked out 
such as contract, tort and restitution. Given the problems which we 
have encountered in this area in recent times, perhaps it is time to 
codify our law of obligations. 
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5.1.3 Nevertheless, the present picture is one of confusion between 
contract and tort, with no clear boundary to be seen. The 'great 
divide' which existed between contract and tort in the traditional view, 
seems to have become a 'grand illusion' in recent times. I do not think 
that the divide can be or should be recreated, but perhaps it is time 
to lay down a few markers again, so as to prevent the present 
confusion from leading to even greater uncertainty in the law. 
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